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(7.) Rules peculiar to prosecutions for bigamy.-Here, too,
the cases are in conflict, some of them holding the first wife of the
alleged bigamist competent to testify against him, on the ground
that his second marriage is an offence committed against her: State
v. Sloan, 13 Ohio. L.N. 145; see Oso, People v. Houiqhton, 24
Hun (N. Y.) 501 ; State v. Rughes, 58 Iowa 165; Williams v.
State, 67 Ga. 260. So, also, the second wife been admitted to testify for the prosecution: Johnson v. State, 61 Ga. 305 ; Finney v.
State, 3 Head (Tenn.) 544. But the true rule as to the second
wife, is believed to be the following, recently laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States: " The ground upon which a
second wife is admitted as a witness against her husband, in
a prosecution for bigamy, is that she is shown not to be a real wife,
by proof of the fact that the accused had previously married another
wife, who was still living, and still his lawful wife. It is only in
case the first marriage is not controverted, or has been duly established by other evidence, that the second wife is allowed to testify,
and she can then be a witness to the second marriage, and not to

the first :" Miles v. United States, 103 U. S. 804, 813; s. c. 2
Crim. L. Mag. 489; reversing, 2 Utah T. 19, and reviewing the
early English cases.
STEWART RAPALJE.
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Supreme Court of Minnesota.
NEWELL v.MINNEAPOLIS, L. & M. RAILWAY Co.
The public easement in a public street is the public and common right to use the
same for the passage of persons and property, and for purposes incidental to such
passage.
The owner of the soil over which a street is laid has the right to insist that a street
shall be used for the legitimate purposes of its creation and existence, and in a manner proper to effectuate the same.
When a street is being used for the purpose (legitimate in its general nature) of
the passage of persons and property, but objection is made to the mode of use, the
question of rightfulness depends upon whether the use objected to is consistent or
inconsistent with the common public use in which every person is entitled to share.
This question of consistency or inconsistency is a question of law. That is to say,
the facts of a given case being ascertained, it is for the court to pronounce upon
their effoct, and to determine whether a manner of using a street complained of is
6r is not, all things considered, a substantial infringement upon the common public
right.
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Held, in the application of the foregoing principles to the particular state of facts
found in this case, and given in detail in the opinion, that the use of a public street
in the city of Minneapolis by defendant, with the permission of the public authorities
for the construction and operation of its railway, is the use of it in aid of the street
as a passenger street railway, and not the imposition upon the soil of the street of a
servitude additional to the proper street easement. And this notwithstanding the fact
that said railway is operated by steam, and is used for the purpose of transporting
persons from the terminus within the city to a point eighteen miles outside of the city
limits, as well as for transporting persons from one point in the city to another, and
that outside of said limits it is, to some extent, operated as an ordinary commercial
railway.
MITCHELL, J., dissents.

Appeal from an order of the District Court, Hennepin county.
Hart & Brewer and A. L. Lei, for appellant.
Cres8, ffics &.Carleton, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BERRY, J.-Plaintiff is owner of certain land abutting on a public street in Minneapolis called "First Avenue South," and therefore owner of the fee of the half of the street adjoining his premises,
subject to the street easement. As the complaint alleges, defendant
-a railway corporation, and assuming to act as such-has wrong*fully entered upon plaintiff's portion of the street, and taken possession thereof for its road-bed, laying down ties and rails thereon,
and using and continuing in possession thereof for the oporation of
its railway, all without plaintiff's consent, and without payment
of compensation. The plaintiff brings this action in the nature of
ejeotment for a restitution. In our judgment the case can present
but two questions:
1. Is the construction, maintenance, and operation of defendant's
railway the imposition upon the soil of First Avenue South, adjacent
to plaintiff's premises, of a servitude additional to the proper public
easement in such street? If this question be answered in the
affirmative, the case is at an end, for the addition servitude (if any
there be), having been imposed upon plaintiff's soil without his consent, and without compensation, he is entitled to put a stop to its
continuance. But if the question be answered in the negative, then
the second question is, can the plaintiff object to defendant's use
of the street for the purposes of its railway ?
To answer the first question it is necessary to consider to some
extent the nature of a street easement. The public easement in a
public street is the public and common right to use the same for the
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passage of persons and things, and for purposes incidental thereto.
The exercise of this right is subject, in some degree, to regulations
to be made by the proper authorities. The ownership of the soil
on which the street is laid being. absolute, subject only to the street
easement, the owner has the right to insist that the street shall be
used and enjoyed for the legitimate purposes of its creation and
existence, and for no others. As the right of use is public and
common, every member of the public, i. e., every person, is entitled
to avail himself of it; and- hence no person can lawfully monopolize
its use, or, what would amount to the same thing, use it so as to
exclude any other person from it.
This proposition is, however, not to be understood as trenching
upon any right which the public authorities may possess to prescribe
the purposes for which a particular street shall be used; as, for
instance, for light or heavy traffic, as the case may be. How the
monopolizing of the use of a street, or the illegal exclusion of any
one from it, is accomplished, cannot be important. They may be
effected either by an appropriation or occupation of the entire surface of the street, or by the use of a part of it in such way as to
render its legitimate use by others impracticable, and thus practically deprive them of its use altogether. Thus, for instance, an
ordinary railroad, constructed and operated in and along a street,
though it is used for the passage of persons and property, and is
therefore, so far as this general nature of its business is concerned,
using the street for proper street purposes, yet the mode of its construction or operation, or both, are such as to monopolize the street,
and virtually and practically exclude the general public from its
legitimate use; so that the use of the street for such railroad is
inconsistent with the common and public use of it, in which every
person is entitled to share, and hence it is held to be the imposition
upon the soil of a servitude differing from, and additional to, that
of the proper and lawful street easement. The case of an ordinary
street railway is otherwise. There the street is also used for the.
passage of persons and property, but in such manner as not, substantially, to interfere with the common and public right of every
person to use the street also; and so the use of a street by such street
railway is held not the imposition of an additional servitude. So
that when a street is being used for the purpose (legitimate in its
general nature) of the passage of persons and property, but objection is made to the mode of use, the question of rightfulness depends
VOL.
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upon whether the use objected to is consistent or inconsistent
with the common public use, in which every person is entitled to
share.
This question of consistency or inconsistency is a question of
law; that is to say, thefacts of a given case being ascertained, it is
for. the court to pronounce upon their effect, and to determine
whether a manner of using a street complained of is or is not, all
things considered, a substantial infringement upon the common
public right. We say a substantial infringement, all things considered, because it is not every mere inconvenience or temporary
hindrance to which one person, in using a street, may be subjected
by the manner in which another uses it, which presents a case of
inconsistency with the common public right. The inconsistency
must be such that the common public use cannot, in its substantial
integrity, co-exist with the use complained of. If the existence of
the latter is inconsistent with the substantial integrity of the former,
then the latter cannot stand as a proper and lawful use of the street
easement. If the use complained of is such that the public and
common right of passage of persons and things cannot be enjoyed
without substantial impairment on account -of the manner of such
use, then it is inconsistent with the public and common right, and
not a proper and lawful use of the easement of the street. But no
merely technical or trifling interruption or obstruction is to be
regarded as a substantial impairment, for common sense requires
that these words should receive a reasonable and liberal conistruction,
and it must always be borne in mind that in organized civil society
the individual must necessarily enjoy a common public right with
reference to the general convenience and the rights of others. The
foregoing rules and principles are, in our judgment, fully supported,
either directly or by logical deduction, by Carli v. Stillwater S. R.
- T. Co., 28 Minn. 373, and the authorities there cited.
It remains to apply them to the facts of this case as found by the
court below to exist when this action was commenced, which, so far
as deemed material for this purpose, are as follows: At the time
when this action was commenced defendant's railway extended from
near the westerly end of the suspension 'bridge, a central place in
the city of Minneapolis, for a distance of one and a half to two
miles within the city limits; thence via Lakes Calhoun and Harriet
for a further distance of about eighteen miles to Lake Minnetonka.
Defendant's line of railway is a single track of three-feet guage
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(with occasional turm.outs), and so laid with a light T rail that thetop of the rail conforms to the surface grade of the street or roadway, and so planked at the sides of the rails, and filled and graded
between tha rails, that the track does not interfere with the passage
of vehicles, or with any use of the highway, more than. do the flat
rails, well laid, of the ordinary horse railroad. The passenger cars
are from 34 to 37 feet long, and so constructed that travellers can
readily step- on or off the same to or from the street or road. Within
the city, and as. far out as Lake Calhoun, they are drawn either
singly or in trains of from two to four cars, and, on rare occasions,
in greater number- than four cars, by Baldwin motors, which are
small steam-engines entirely encased in cabs, so that no part of the
machinery is visible from the outside, and-from 19 to 21 feet long,
having the appearance of a short car, except that a smoke-pipe
about nine inches in diameter stands a foot or more above the top
of the cab. No bell or whistle is used. The steam is exhaustedin the engine. Anthracite coal is used for fuel, making little or no
smoke, and neither smoke nor steam is often perceptible. Between
Lake Calhoun and Minnetonka a narrow-guage locomotive engine
is used to draw some trains, and some are drawn by the motors.
Six trips or more each way per day have been regularly made
between the city terminus of the railway and Lake Calhoun, but a
less number between Lakes Calhoun and Minnetonka. The cars
are moved along First Avenue South, past plaintiff's land, and
through all the closely-settled portion of the city, it a speed of
three to four miles an hour, and are furnished with air-brakes, and
can be stopped in the distance of from two to six feet. Between
the closely-settled portions of the city and Lake Calhoun the speed
is greater, reaching six miles an hour, and between Lakes Calhoun
and Minnetonka it is increased in some places to fifteen miles an
hour or more. There are no depots, stations, or platforms connected
with said railway, but within the city, and as far out as Lake Calhoun, the passengers are taken on and let off along the street, and
at street crossings, whenever they choose, as is customary on street
railways. The uniform fare for passengers within the city limits,
as existing when this action was brought, has been five cents, with
the same fare for persons residing near the line of the railway as
far out as Lake Calhoun. Higher rates of fare for other persons
travelling between the city and the lakes, and between the lakes or
points outside of said city limits, have been fixed and received.
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Between Lakes Calhoun and Minnetonka the cars stop to take up
and discharge passengers at any highway ciossing. Within the
city, as bounded when this action was commenced, defendant's railway has been operated solely for the carriage of passengers, and a
large share of its business and income has arisen from passengers
carried thereon from point to point, as they might desire, along the
streets traversed by said railway. In the warm season it also carries many passengers gathered up along such streets to said lakes,
and back again, such lakes being suburban resorts, frequented in
such seasons by inhabitants of, and sojourners in, said city. Between Lake Minnetonka and a point near, but outside, the recent
boundary of the city, said railway has carried some cord-wood and
other freight.
These are, in substance, the facts found by the trial court upon
the branch of this case now under consideration, and upon them
our decision must be based ; for they are supported by the-evidence,
and if it be true that upon any particular point or points the evidence would warrant fuller or other findings, that defect (if it exists)
should have been remedied upon a motion to correct the findings
before bringing the case to this court. Upon its findings of fact the
trial court was of opinion, and so found, as conclusions of law,
(2) that defendant's railway, as constructed and operated on First
Avenue South, and elsewhere within the limits of the city as bounded
when this action was commenced, was and is a passenger street
railway, and this character is not changed by the fact that between
some point outside of said city limits and Lake Minnetonka it
ceases to be a passenger street railway; (3) that the construction
and operation of said railway partly on that part of First Avenue
South of which the "ultimate fee" is in the plaintiff does not constitute any additional burden or servitude beyond the public easement contemplated in the dedication of the street, nor any taking or
appropriation of the property of the plaintiff as owner of the fee.
Both of these conclusions are, in our judgment, correct.
The first clause of the first, viz., that defendant's' railway is a
passenger street railway, is in effect a finding that its use consists
in the transfer of persons along or over the streets within the city,
and would seem to be a mere result or summing up of the previous
findings of fact upon that subject, and it is therefore, perhaps, quite
as much in the nature of a conclusion of fact as a conclusion of
law. It is enough to say in regard to it that it is the legitimate
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result of the previous findings of fact. The last clause of this
conclusion, viz., that this character of the railway is not changed
by the fact that at some point outside of the city it ceases to be a
passenger street railway, is right as a conclusion of law. If it is,
in-fact, a passenger street railway within the city limits, how can,
it become anything- else ther because it becomes something else
elsewhere ? A person -who desires to go from any part, of Minneapolis to San Francisco has the same right to use the streets of the
former city for the purpose of passing out of it on his way to his
destination as a person who simply desires to pass from one place in
Minneapolis to another in the same city. The use of the streets
is just as legitimate, and just as clearly and completely a lawful
and proper enjoyment of the public and common easement, in the
one case as in the other.
Take the case of an old-fashioned stage line, taking its passengers from its-station, say at the Nicollet House, in Minneapolis, and
conveying them to Shakopee, would it ever occur to any one that
the use for that purpose of the streets of Minneapolis as far as they
extended on the way would not be entirely legitimate, and entirely
within the purposes of dedication, because the streets used were
only a, part, and small part, of the entire route of the line, and the
line was run exclusively for the purpose of conveying persons to and
from places outside of the city of Minneapolis ? Or is it any objection
to the use of a street by a horse railway that the line extends into
the country, and carries passengers accordingly. Such illustrations
as these (and they could be multiplied indefinitely), as it seems to
us, demonstrate the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the
trial court, which we are now considering. It cannot be that a
proper use of the streets of a city can be made improper by the fact
that the instrumentalities through which that use is enjoyed, are
changed, as respects their mode of operation, after the city boundaries are passed over, or that the use of the streets of a city for the
purpose of going out of it, or of coming into it, can be improper or
illegitimate, or in any sense the imposition of a servitude additional
to the ordinary street easement.
The other conclusion of law, viz., that the construction and
operation of defendant's railway does not impose any additional
servitude, etc., has given us more trouble: for while the previous
finding that defendant's railway is, within the city limits, a passenger street railway may be true in the sense that it is there a railway
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used and operated exclusively, or substantially so, for the transportation of passengers from one part of the city to another, still
that fact alone and by itself would not materially distinguish it from
what is styled by counsel an ordinary "commercial railway," used
exclusively to bring passengers into, or carry them out of, the city.
Yet this ordinary commercial road (so called) has been held by this
court, in several cases, as well as by a majority of the courts in
other states, to impose a servitude additional to the ordinary street
easement, and therefore to infringe the rights of the owner of the
soil over which the street is laid. It is otherwise, however, with
the ordinary horse street railway. Where, then, is the distinction ?
Both are used for the conveyance of persons from one part of the
city to another, and in that sense both are street railways, and both
operated in aid of the street, to facilitate the passage of persons
over the same. We think the answer to the question is found in
the general rules and principles laid down, and to some extent
expounded, in the early part of this opinion.
A railway upon a street, engaged in carrying persons and things
over the same, whether from one point to another on such street or
in the city, or from points inside to those outside, or vice versa, is
or is not rightfully using the street (with, of course, the sanction-of
the proper authorities), according as its use is or is not consistent
with the common public use of the street, in which every person is
entitled to share. Now, whatever facts may exist in this case, or
whatever facts may have been shown which are not embraced in any
finding, there is nothing in the findings of fact from which it can be
inferred, as a .conclusion of law, that defendant's use of the street,
in constructing, maintaining or operating its railway, is inconsistent
with the common public use; nothing to show that the two uses
may not co-exist without any substantial infringement or interruption of the latter by the former ; while, so far as construction and
maintenance are concerned, the facts are expressly found that the
surface of the street is not essentially changed or disturbed. There
is no fact found showing that the operation of defendant's railway
seriously jeopardizes or interferes with the safety and security or
convenience, as respects either person or property, of any one who
desires to avail himself of the public and common right of user. It
may well be that defendant's railway could be so operated, even as
a purely passenger street railway, as substantially to interfere with,
if not to put a practical end to, the use of the street by the general
public.
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It is not impossible to conceive that an ordinary horse street railway could be operated with like effect. Suppose, for instance, that
a horse railway were permitted to occupy the entire breadth of a
street with its tracks,, and to run its cars at the-rate of one in one
or two minutes, what would be the value of the ordinary street
easement in such a state of facts? This illustration is, as it seems
to us, in point for the purpose of showing that the manner and"
effect of operating a street railway are- the tests of its-rightfulness;
and while the manner and effect of operatfing defendant's railway
might have been such as to interfere substantially with the public
and common right, the findings do not show that it was so- in thiscase, which, as it is important to bear in mind, was tried with reference to the state of facts set up in the pleadings as subsisting at the
time when this action was commenced.
C6-.,
The railway- in question in Carli v. Stilwater S. B.
supra, was neither more nor Iess than a connecting link between
two ordinary (so called) commercial railways. The effect was the
same as-if one of these railways had. been extended over it to a
junction with the other, so that the railway in that case was really
and in- effect an ordinary "commercial railway, and in no sense in
aid" of the street. Upon this ground the opinion and determination in that case proceeded, holding that under the decisions of this
court, and in accordance with the view prevalent elsewhere, that as
such ordinary commercial railway it imposed a servituder upon thestreet additional to the proper street easement. But the defendant's
railway is a different thing, and clearly in aid of the streets over
which it runs. It takes on and discharges passengers at any street
crossing upon its line, as does an ordinary horse railway ; and this
practice applies as well to those who get on for the purpose of going
out of the city or of coming into it, as to those who get on and also
get off within the city limits. Such a railway is in aid of the street
because it facilitates the passage of persons over the street, enabling
them, in large numbers, to pass over it with far less noise, trouble
and expense than if each should pass on foot or in an ordinary
vehicle, and without, so far as this case shows, any substantial
interference with the public and common right of passage. Upon
all these considerations we therefore conclude that defendant's railway was, within the city, properly a street railway ; and that its
construction, maintenance and operation do not impose upon plaintiffs soil a servitude additional to that of the ordinary street ease-T.
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ment, so as to make defendant's use of the street unlawful without
coarvensation to plaintiff.
Having thus answered the first main question presented in this
case in the negative, we are brought to consider the second, viz. Can the pTaintiff object to defendant's use of the street (in the
manner found by the trial court) for the purposes of its railway?
We say whether the plaintif' can object, because if-he cannot it
makes no difference in this actiom whether defendant has in fact
any legal right to construct, maintain, an& operate its railway on
First Avenue South or not. The plaintiff having, as we have seen,
no right to object on the-ground that defendant's use of the street
imposes a servitude additional to the proper street easement, his
objection, if any, must be that defendant is not authorized to use
the street easement in the way in which it does. The charter of the
city of Minneapolis commits the care, supervision and control of
the streets to the common council. By ordinances passed March
22d (1882), before this action was commenced (in November, 1882),
and subsequently, the council gave defendant permission to operate
its railway, and with steam-power, on First Avenue South, and other
streets, to June 1st (1883), .adate subsequent to the trial of this
action. As a result of this, and of the conclusion arrived at upon
the first branch of the case, the defendant was in fact lawfully in
its possession (such as it was) and use of the street, so far as thepublic authorities were concerned. It had, at least, their license
and acquiescence in its favor.
But it seems that by an ordinance of July 9th (1875), a- corporation denominated the Minneapolis Street Railway Company was
granted the exclusive right, subject to conditions not here important,
of constructing and operating street railways in the city of Minneapolis, in such streets as the city council may deem suited to that
purpose; and by ordinances of July 3d and 8th (1878, said "company," its successors and assigns, were authorized, upon similar
conditions as above, to construct and maintain a street railway line
on First Avenue South, and other streets (being the route of defendant's railway) ; and "to operate such line of railway with animal,
steam, or other power, the right to prohibit the use of steam when
the public good required being reserved." On October 24th (1878),
The Minneapolis Street Railway Company and the defendant, pursuant to authority given by their respective boards of directors,
formally entered into a written contract, whereby, among other
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things, and for a sufficient consideration, the street railway company
leased to the latter, for forty-three years, its rights and franchises, to
the use for suburban railway purposes, of First Avenue South, and
said other streets, and the lease was duly recorded November 17th
(1878). Immediately upon the execution of this contract defendant entered upon First Avenue South, and the other streets mentioned, and at large expense, constructed thereon its railway, which
it has ever since maintained and operated, no other railway having
been constructeci on that route.
Now, upon this state of facts, and with reference to the conclusion- arrived at upon the first branch of- this case, both the. public
authorities and the street railway company appear- to acquiesce in
and. sanction defendant's use of the streets. It matters not whether
defendant is. acting strictly within the terms of its charter or of the
so-called lease from the street railway. It is tikere upon the
gruand, in actual possession (so far as necessary) and use of the
streets. Whether it is there as a corporation, association, or partnership ; whether in the exercise of its lawful corporate franchises,
or ultra vires-so long as its use of the streets is a proper street
use, under sanction of public authority-the plaintiff cannot complain. If the exclusive franchise of the street railway company is
invaded, either because the so-called lease is unauthorized and void
as a lease, because- executed without proper authority, or because
the rights of that company are not transferable, or because defendant is not an " assign" within the meaning of the ordinance, that is
the affair of the streetrailway company, or of the city, or, possibly,
of the state, and not of the plaintiff. For these reasons the second.
main question in the case must be answered in the negative also.
Order denying new trial affirmed.
MITCHELL, J. (dissenting).-Itseems to me that the maintenance
and operation of defendant's railroad constitutes a servitude, additional to, and different from, the use for- which the streets were
acquired-in short, a new use of the streets, not contemplated at
the time of their dedication. I do not see that this road differs
materially from any ordinary "commercial" railroad, except that
it uses the entire length of the street as its depot, at which it
receives and lets off passengers. As operated, it is, to a certain
extent, in aid of travel on the street; but this is a secondary and
incidental, and not its main and principal, purpose. The doctrine
VOL. XXXI.-56
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of the opinion will, it seems to me, lead to the insidious encroach.
ment of any and all railroads upon the public streets, by their simply adopting certain slight and merely colorable changes in their
mode of operation. I therefore dissent.
The legislature may authorize a railway to lay its tracks in the streets of a
cityor it may delegate its power over such
use to the municipalc orporation ; and in
the absence of proper authority the use
of a street for railway purposes is a nuisance: Davis v. Mayor, 14 N.I Y. 506;
D. 4-S. Ry. v. D. C. Ry., 2 Col. 673;
A. C. Rd. v. Memphis, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.)
406; .Harrisonv. N. 0. P. Ry., 34 La.
Ann. 462.
The legislature may authorize a railway to use city streets without providing
for compensation to the city and without
its consent: People v. Kerr, 37 Barb.
357; B. C. 4- N. Rd. v. C. 1. 6- B.
Rd., 35Id. 364; C.N.4-S. W. Rd.v.
Newton, 36 Ia. 299; Clinton v. C. R. 4a. R Rd., 24 Id. 299; S. 6- T. Rd. v.
Savannah, 45 Ga. 602.
The decisions of the courts upon the
rights of abutting lot-owners to compensation are too numerous and conflicting
to be reconciled ; yet a few distinctions
seem to have been generally recognised.
SvEAxt RuLwA-Ys.-l. Where the fee
in the street remains in the abutting lot
owner, it seems to have been generally
held that the construction of a steam railway in a street is an additional burden,
not contemplated in the original taking,
for which the lot-owner is entitled to compensation: Adams v. H. 6- D. Rd., 18
Minn. 260; Harringtonv. St. P. 4- C.
R. Co., 17 Id. 215; Gray v. St. P. 6P. Rd., 13 Id. 315 ; Schurmeier v. St.
P. 4- P. Rd., 10 Id. 82; Imlay v. U.
B. Rd., 26 Conn. 249 ; G.RB. 6 LRdI . v.
Heisel, 38 Mich. 62; Hinchman v. P.
H. Rd., 17 N. J. Eq. 75 ; Wet,nore v.
Story, 22 Barb. 414 ; Adams v.S. - T.
Rd., 11 Id. 414; Stetson v. C. 4-E. Rd.,
75 Ill. 74; 1.B. 6- IV. v. Lartley, 67
Id. 439; Protzman v. L 4- C. Rd., 9

Ind. 467; Kucheman v. C. C. 6- D. Ry.,
46 Ia. 366 ; Springfield v. C. R. Rd., 4
Cush. 63; Wagerv. T. U. Rd.. 25 N
Y. 526; Carpenterv. 0. 4- S. Rd., 24
Id. 655; Mahon v. N. Y. C.Rd., Id.
658; Williams v. N Y. C.By., 16 Id.
97 ; Sherman v. M. L. S. 4- IV. Rd.,
40 Wis. 645 ; Heqar v. C. 4- 1N. W.
Rd., 26 Id. 624 ; Pomeroy v. J!. 4- C.
Rd., 16 Id. 670; Ford v. C. N. 6- W.
iRy., 14 Id. 609.
In Pres. Soc. v. A. 6- R. Rd., 3 Hill
567, where the legislature had authorized
the construction of a steam railway in a
street, the fee to which remained in the
abutting lot-owners, in delivering the
opinion of the court, NELSON, C. J., said :
IIt is quite clear that the legislature had
no power to authorize the company to enter
upon and appropriate the land in question for purposes other than those to
which it had been originally dedicated in
pursuance of the highway act, without
first providing a just compensation."
To the same effect is the opinion of
Judge REDFIELD : "I This is undoubtedly
the rule of the English ]aw and of reason
and jusdce , and we should rejoice to see
it prevail moreextensively in this country.
The American courts seem to have been
sometimes led astray upon thissubject by
the fallacy that a railway is merely an
improved highway, which for many purposes it is, but not for all any more than a
canal:" Red. on Rys. (4th ed.) 299 n.
"The travel on them [steam-railways]
bears no analogy to our notions of travel
on an ordinary street or highway, where
every one travels at pleasure in his own
conveyance without paying tolls or fares.
The uses are totally different and even
inconsistent: 1 Dillon 3unic. Corp. (3d
ed.) 698.
'The constitutional question cannot
depend upon the accidental circumstance
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that the new road will or will not have
an injurious effect ; though that circumstance is properly referred to, since it is
difficult to perceive how a change of use
which may possibly have an injurious
effect, not contemplated in the original
appropriationi can be considered anything else than the imposition of a new
burden uponthe owner's estate :" Cooley
Const. Lim. 548.
Yet some courts have held: that the constructionof a steam railway is not an additional burdn- upon the abutting lot
owner's fee in the street entitling him to
compensation : Black v. P 6- .LRd., 58
Penn. St. 249 ; Snyder v. P. Rd., 55
Id. 340; Case of P. 4- Trenton R., 6
Whart. 25%; M. 4!E. Rd. v. Newark, 2
Stock. Ch. 352; L. 4- 0. v. Appelgate,
8 Dana 289 ; Cosby v. 0. J- R. Rd. 10
Bush 288.
2. Where the fee in the street is in the
city, it has generally been held that the
abutting lot-owner is-not entitled to compensation, unless he has suffered special
damage, and a depreciation in the value
of the property from the location of the
road is not to be considered : Plantv. L.
I. Rd., 10 Barb. 26; Chapman v. A.4S. Rd., Id. 360 ; People v. Kerr, 37
Id. 357 ; C. B. 4- Q. Rd. v. McGinnis,
79 111. 269 ; Stone v. F. P. 4- N. W.
Rd., 68 Id. 394 ; Murphy v. Chicago,
29 Id. 279 ; Moses v. P. F. W. 4- C.
Rd., 21 Id. 516; Hine v. K. 4- D. l.
Rd., 42 Ia. 636 ; Davenport v. Stevenson, 34 Id. 225 ; Cook v. Burlington, 30
Id. 94; Milburn v. Cedar Rapids, 12
Id. 246; A. 4- N. Rd. v. Garside,
10 Kan. 552; L. 4- F. Rd. v. Brown,
17 B. Mlon. 763; Lacldand v. N. M.
Rd., 34 Mo. 259; Porterv. N. .l. Rd.,
33 Id. 128 ; H. 4- Z. Cn. Rd. v. Odum,
53 Tex. 343.
But for any special damages to buildings, or for obstructions to free access to
premises, or from negligent construction
or other damages, amounting to more than
a mere inconvenience, the abutting lotowner is entitled to recover : S. C. Rd. v.

Steiner, 44 Ga. 546; Rigney v-. Chicagor
102 Ill. 64 ; &one *. F. P. 4- N TV.
Rd., 68 Ill. 394; Cadle v. N. IV. Rd.
44 Ia. 11 ; L C. _Rd. v. Boden, 10 Ind.
96; Cosbg v. O. 4- R. Rd., 10 Bush
288; B. 4 M. Rd. v.' Reinhackle, 15
Neb. 279; Kellinger v. F. S. Rd., 50
N. Y. 206 ; A. 4- E. Rd. v. Newark,
2 Stock. Ch. 352 ; Fifth Nat. Bank v.
N Y. E. Rd., 21 Fed. Rep. 114. But
see Slatten v. D. M. Rd., 29 Ia. 148.
"The owner of a lot fronting on a
particular street, has a peculiar interest
in that street. His title carries with it
as an essential incident, certain valuable
an&indispensable services and easements
in and over that street, which are as inviolable as his property in the lot itself.
**
* But his peculiar right does not
depend'upon or spring out of the ownership of the fee:" X AL4- I. Rd. v.Esterle, 13 Bush 667.
3. In S. P. Rd.v. Reed,41 Cal. 256,
where the ownership of the fee seems to
have received no attention in the opinion
of the court, it was held that the lotowner sbould be compensated.
Under a clause in the state constitution that "private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public or private
use without just compensation" it hasbeen held that the lot-owner must be
compensated, even though the fee in the
street is in the city : Mollandin v. U. P.
Ry., 14 Fed. Rep. 394 ; Rigney v. 1hicago, 102 Ill. 64-.
HoRsE l AILwAX.-'The rule obtains
very generally that the construction of a
horse railway in a city street is a proper
use of the street, and that the abutting
lot-o-er cannot recover compensation
therefor, whether he owns the fee in the
street or not: C. St. Ry. v. Covington,
19 Am. L. Reg. 765 ; Elliott v. F. H.
W. Rd., 32 Conn. 579 ; V. J. Rd. v.
C. M. 4- S. L. Rd., 34 N. J. Eq. 164;
Rinchman v. P. ff. Rd., 17 Id. 75 ; G.
R. 4- 1- Rd. v. llesel, 38 Mich. 62;
Atty.-Gen. v. AM.Rd. 125 ass. 515;
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STEAM MoToaS.-In Stanley v. Davenin 1 ew York the ownership of the fee port, 54 Ia. 468, the court say: "It
seexrs to be regarded as the criterion as will be conceded, if no change is made
to whether the lot-owner can recover in the grade of the street, the weight of
compensation or not ; Craigv. B. 4- B. authority seems to be, the city may au1d., S9 Barb. 494; B. C. - N. Rd. v. thorize a horse railway to occupy the
C.J4- B. Rd., 35 Id. 364 B.C 4-J. same.
This doctrine is based on the
Ra. v. B. C. Bd., 33 Id. 420; People ground, there is no annoyance from
v. K'err, 27 N. Y. 188.
fire, smoke, steam-whistles, or rapid proThe rule as to special damages would gress, and it does not signify that the
probably be similar to that governing street railroad has an exclusive right to
-team railways: Hobart v. M. C. Rd., use its own track when occasion requires.
27 Wis. 194; C. 4-S. G. A. St. By. v. * ** It does not therefore follow the
Aummins&ille, 14 Ohio St. 523.
conceded proposition, that a city may
If the horse railway company accepts lawfully allow the street to be occupied
a charter providing for compensation to by a horse railroad, that it may do so
lot-owners, it is, of course, bound by where the road is operated by steam
its acceptance to pay: People v. Law, power."
CHAs. A. RoBrNs.
Lincoln, Neb.
34 Barb. 494.
Hobart v. JL C. Rd., 27 Wis. 194. But

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
STATE

Ex REL.

ATWATER v. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA AND
WESTERN RAILROAD CO.

A railroad company chartered as a common carrier of passengers and freight,
is under no obligation to establish commutation rates fora particular locality, but
when it has established such rates, and commutation tickets are sold thereat to the
public, the refusal of such a ticket to a particular individual, under the same circumstances and upon the same conditions as such tickets are sold to the rest of the public,
is an unjust discrimination against him, and a violation of the principle of equality
which the company is bound to observe in the conduct of its business.
The relator was the holder of a monthly commutation ticket. On one occasion,
during the month for which his ticket was issued, he left it at home by inadvertence,
and, when on the train, being asked for his ticket and not finding it, he tendered to
the conductor a regular trip ticket, provided it should not be punched, and should be
returned to him the next morning on presentation of his commutation ticket, and
refused otherwise to pay his fare. This request the conductor refused, for the reason
that he had no right to permit the relator to ride on a ticket which should not be
punched, and the relator remained on the train without paying fare or surrendering
the trip ticket and without any disturbance being made. Held, that the relator, by
such conduct, made himself liable to be ejected from the train, and it may be to the
forfeiture of the commutation ticket, he then held, but that such misconduct did not
justify the company in refusing to sell the relator commutation tickets thereafter;
and that for such wrongful refusal, the relator may have remedy by mandamus.

ON rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue. The
relator, an attorney and counsellor-at-law, practising his profession
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in the city of New York, resides at East Orange, in this state. le
testified that he is permanently residing at that place, having
resided there since August 1884, occupying a rented house, the
present lease of which expires May 1st, 1886. East Orange is on
the line of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad, the
only railroad between East Orange and New York city. The regular fare between East Orange and New York city is 26 cents for a
single ticket, and 50 cents for an excursion ticket. Monthly commutation tickets, such as the company is accustomed to sell to persons who apply for them, are sold at the rate of $6.50. Until
March 1885, the relator was a commuter, purchasing monthly
tickets at commutation rates.
On the 28th of February 1885, the relator applied to the company's agent, whose business it was to sell tickets of that class, for
a commutation ticket for the ensuing month of March, and tendered
the price of the ticket. The agent refused to sell the relator a
ticket, and- assigned as his reason therefor, that he had received
instructions not to sell the relator commutation.tickets. The relator,
on the 1st of March, applied again for the ticket, and was again
refused. The agent testified that in refusing to sell the ticket to
the relator, he acted under written instructions to him from the
company's passenger agent, of the date of February 7th, 1885, in
these words: "If Henry G. Atwater, who now holds commutation
ticket No. 27, applies to you for a renewal of his ticket next month,
refuse to sell him one. He has violated the rule governing the sale
of commutation tickets, and, as these are special tickets, the company has the right to refuse the privilege of buying one to any
person who wilfully violates the rules. If Mr. Atwater asks any
questions, simply tell him that you are acting under instructions,
and refer him to this office, or to Supt. Reasoner." On the day of
the first refusal, the relator wrote to the president of the company,
stating that a commutation ticket for March had been refused,
claiming the right to buy the same on the same terms as other persons, and stating that if it was again refused he would take proceedings to insure his rights and compel the issuance of the ticket. To
this no answer was received. The agent testified that the order
contained in the instructions of February 7th was never countermanded or withdrawn. Monthly commutation tickets were sold at
East Orange, for the month of March 1885, to all persons desiring
to purchase, with the exception of the relator. The relator, on the
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7th of March 1885, applied fbr and obtained a rule to show cause
why a mandamus- should not issue commanding the company "ta
cease from discrimination against Henry G. Atwater, the relator,
and ta furnish him with transportation between East Orange and
N
New York upon the same terms which it furnishes the same transportation to other persons, and to- issue and deliver to the said
relator commutation tickets between said East Orange and New
York as often and whenever he shall demand the same, upon the
same terms and conditions, and for the same price upon and at
which it issues and delivers them to persons in general, other than
the relator."
Cornelius . See, for relator.
J. .D. Bedle, contra.
The opinion, of the court was delivered by
DEPUE, J.-The Morris & Essex Railroad Company was incor-

porated in 1885, to construct a railroad for the purpose of carrying
passengers and freight. The charter authorized the company to
charge for the carriage of passengers and freight, and prescribed
the limits of the rates to be"charged per ton for the transportation
of freight, and per mile for the carriage of passengers : P.. L. 1835,
p. 29, sect. 10. In-virtue of its charter rights and privileges, the
company became a common carrier of passengers and freight. By
legislative authority, the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, as lessee of the company's railroad, was invested
with its franchises, rights and privileges, subject, of course- to all
the obligations and duties resting on the lessor.
At this day it would be superfluous to enter upon a discussion to
support the doctrine, so well settled, that common carriers are
public agents, transacting their business under an obligation to observe equality towards every member of the community-to serve
all persons alike, without giving any unjust or unreasonable advantages, by way of facilities, for the carriage or rates for transporting
them: 1 Wood Rys., sect. 195. The leading case on this subject
is Messenger v. PennsylvaniaRd. Co., reported, as decided in the
Supreme Court, in 36 N. J. Law 407, and in the Court of Errors,
in 37 N. J. Law 531. In his opinion, in the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice BEASLEY says: "It was one of the primary obligations of the common carrier, to receive and carry all goods offered
for transportation, upon receiving a reasonable hire. * * * Thus,
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in the very foundation and substance, there was inherent a rule
which excluded a-preference of one consignor of goods over- another. * * * Recognising this as the settled doctrine, I do not see
how it can be admissible for a common carrier to demand a different
hire from various persons for an identical kind of service, under
A person having a public duty to disidentical conditions. * **
charge is undoubtedly bound to exercise such office for the equal
benefit of all, and therefore to permit a common carrier to charge
various prices, according to the person with whom he deals, for
the same services, is to forget that he owes a debt to the community."
On affirmance of this case, the Court of Errors was equally emphatic in affirming the doctrine that a common carrier owes an equal
duty to all, which is not discharged, if unequal preferences are made
and the enjoyment of the common right is thereby prevented or
impaired. How uniformly the doctrine of this case has been adopted
and applied, will be seen by the citations and extracts from opinions
of the courts of our sister states, given by Mr. Justice ATHERTo,
in his opinion, in the recent case of Schofield v. Lake Shore ,4 3f
S. By., 3 N. E. Rep. 907. A collection of cases illustrative of the
application of the same principle, to railroad, express, telegraph,
gas mad water companies, will be found in a note to B. & 0. Tel.
Co. v. Bell Telephone Co., 24 Amer. Law Reg. (N. S.) 578.
There is also a considerable line of cases holding that the carrier
may discriminate in the rates charged for the transportation of different classes of goods, or in favor of persons shipping large quantities of freight, or in favor of the long distances for which freight
is carried as against shorter distances, or upon ground which would
reduce the trouble or cost of carrying for one party as compared
with another. Some of these cases were decided on the "equality
clause" in the English statutes, which our courts have held to be
merely declaratory of the common law.
Others were decided on common-law principles, without any statutory regulations of the subject. An examination of cases of this
class will show that the common-law of obligation of common carriers to deal with all persons on an equality, is tacitly, if not
expressly, recognised; for such discriminations have been upheld
only where, under the same circumstances and for the same class
of goods, the same rates would be charged to all, or the discrimination, if made under special circumstances, appeared to be just and
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reasonabFe: _Ransome v. Eastern Counties By., 1 C. R. (N. S.)
437; s. c. 4 G. B. (N. S.) 135; In re Caterham By., 1 0. B.
(N. S.) 410; In re Oxlade, Id-. 454 ; Baxendale v. Great Western
By., 5 0. B. (N. S;) 809, 836, 354; _Nicholson v. Great Western
By., Id. 866; Garton r. Great Western By., Id. 669; Garton v.
Bristol & E. By. 6 G. B. (NlS.) 639; Bazendale v. Eastern
Counties By., 4 G. B. (N. S.) 63; .Evera ed v. LonTan & Y. W.
By., 2 Q. B. Div. 254, 267; Crouckv. Lonaon&N . W. By., 2 Car.
& K. 789-804; 1 Wood Rys., sects. 197, 198; 3 Wood Rys., sect.
496; Stewart v. Lehigh Valley By., 38 N. J. Law 505, 520.
And it is indisputable that, where the carrier has a fixed schedule
of rates for carriage for the public generally, a demand, from one
person, of a higher rate for the same service would be unlawful,
although the rate demanded was less than its charter allowed; for
such an incorporated company has the double duty to keep within
the limit of charges prescribed by its charter, and also to conform to
that common-law obligation to observe equality in charges with
respect to all, which the law of the* land lays upon all the business
for which it was incorporated.
The principle above stated is applicable to the case in hand. By
virtue of the charter under which the company transacts its busi-.
ness, it is a common carrier of passengers as yell as of goods, and
in that capacity is obliged to carry all passengers who are ready to
pay for their transportation, and liable to an action at the suit of any
one whom it refuses to carry without lawful excuse: Story, Bailm.
p. 591 ; Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481; Jencks v. Coleman, 2
Sum. 221 ; Bennett v. Peninsular& 0. S. B. By., 6 C. B. 775 ;
Beekman v-. Saratoga &' S. Bd., 3 Paige 45. And as was said by
the court in the Messenger Case, in virtue of its charter rights and
privileges, the company is a public agent, and, as such agent, is
placed under a duty to exercise its calling with perfect impartiality
towards all persons.
Carrying passengers upon commutation tickets at a less rate than
the charges for single tickets has become a usual mode with railroad companies in prosecuting the carrying business. It is a mode
of transacting business of substantial benefit to those who are able
to avail themselves of the privilege ; and, at the same time, is greatly
conducive to the growth and prosperity of parts of the state lying
adjacent to the large cities. Indeed, a considerable, if not a greater
part of the passenger carrying business in localities contiguous to
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the great business centres of the country, is transacted under this
system, and the rental and market value of lands in such localities
is largely determined by the ability to procure transportation at
reduced commutation rates. The denial of this privilege to a particular individual is to him a substantial injury. A company is
under no obligation to establish commutation rates for a particular
locality, but when it has established such rates, and commutation
tickets are sold thereat to the public, the refusal of such a ticket to.
a particular individual, under the same circumstances and upon the
same conditions as such tickets are sold to the rest of the public,, is
an unjust discrimination against him and a violation of the principle
of equality which the company is bound to observe in the conduct
of its business. There is not a perceptible shade of difference between the denial of a commutation ticket, under such circumstances,
and the refusal to sell the same individual an ordinary ticket, at the
customary rate, and demanding of him the utmost price allowed in
the company's charter, in excess of the usual price at which such
tickets are sold to the public; and such denial cannot be made to
square with the principles laid down and emphasized in the Ales8enger Case.
The excuses the law admits of as sufficient to justify a common
carrier in refusing to admit a passenger willing to pay his fare,
relate to the character or conditions of the proposed passenger, or
the inability of the carrier to carry such person for want of room in
the vehicle. For instance, the carrier is not bound to receive
gamblers, thieves or known pickpockets, who seek to board the train
to ply their vocations; persons whose conduct is riotous or disorderly,
or one whose person or clothing is so filthy as to be obnoxious to other
passengers, or who is afflicted with a contagious disease, or intoxicated to such an extent as to render it probable that he would be
disagreeable or annoying to passengers: 2 Wood Rys., sect. 297 ;
Boone, Corp., p. 259. The carrier may also exclude a passenger
who refuses to comply with the reasonable rules and regulations of
the company. In this instance the excuse for refusing to sell the
relator a commutation ticket is his refusal to pay his fare on one
occasion during the previous month, when, by inadvertence, he had
left his commutation ticket at home. The facts of that transaction
are these: That'on the 6th of February the relator, holding a
commutation ticket for the month of February, took passage in the
company's cars for New York city; that the baggage-master came
VOL. XXXIV.-57
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through the cars collecting tickets, and asked the relator for his
ticket; that the relator looked for his commutation ticket, and could
not find it, and thereupon offered a regular trip ticket, provided it
should not be punched, and provided it should be returned to him
the next morning, on presentation of his regular commutation ticket,
and refused otherwise to pay his fare; that the same offer was made
to the, conductor and was refused for the reason that the latter had
no right to permit the relator to ride on a ticket that should not be
punched. The relator rode to Hoboken without paying fare or
surrendering his trip ticket, and no disturbance was made.
He knew.and should have respected the duties of the employees on
the train, in the enforcement of the company's rules. By his conduct he made himself liable to ejection from the train, and it may
be to the forfeiture of the commutation ticket he then held. But
we think that his misconduct did not justify the company in excluding the relator thereafter from a privilege in which, as a member of
the community, he was entitled to participate, in common with
others of the public. Such a measure of punitive justice has not
been granted by any statute, and if inflicted by any regulation of
the company, which it was not, would be an unreasonable exercise
of the company's power to make rules and regulations for the government of passengers.
The relator's right to proceed by mandamus is disputed. It is
insisted that his only remedy is by action for damages. It is undisputed that mandamus is an appropriate remedy for withholding a
right such as the relator has in this instance, and that the court in
its discretion will award the writ, if justified by the circumstances :
Sate v. Railroad Co., 87 Conn. 154; Chicago & N. W. Rd. v.
People,56 Ill. 865; High, Extr. Rem. § 822. It will be observed
that the relator testified that his residence at East Orange is a permanent residence, and that the lease for the house he occupies
extends until May 1st next. His business is established in the city
of New York. He also testified that the agent's refusal was to sell
him any more commutation tickets, and it does not appear that the
terms of the agent's instructions by letter of February 7th, were
communicated to him. The agent, on his examination as a witness
on the 1st day of May 1885, testified that the order so given had
not been countermanded or withdrawn, and it is manifest from this
litigation that it is intended not to admit the relator's right until a
decision upon that right shall be obtained-a circumstance which is
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sufficient evidence of refusal to justify the award of a mandamus :
State v. Freeholders of Ocean, 47 N. J. Law 417. Furthermore,
the relator applied for and obtained a rure to show cause on the
7th of March, and brought on the argument of the rule at the first
term of this court thereafter. The delay in the decision of the
case was due to causes for which the relator is in nowise responsible, and action for damages, with the obligation to demand and to,
tender the price of a commutation ticket, from month to month, and
make a payment of the fares charged under protest every time,
would be an inadequate and vexatious means of enforcing the
relator's rights."
Under the circumstances, we think a peremptory mandamus, in
conformity with the terms of the rule to show cause, should be
granted.
An early definition of a common carrier is "any man undcrtaking, for hire,
to carry the goods of all persons indifferently:" Gisbourn v. Burst, I Salk.
250. A more recent definition is "every
person who undertakes to carry, for a
compensation, the goods of all persons
indifferently, is, as to the liability imposed,
to be considered a common carrier:"
Orange Bank v. Brown, 3 Wend. 161.
See U. S. Express Co. v. Backman, 28
Ohio St. 150. It will be observed that
these definitions involve a serving of the
public without discrimination between
persons, so far as it relates to the carrying of "goods ;" but, as we shall see,
this same rule is applicable to the carrying of persons also; B. 6- 0. Rd. v.
.Adams' Express Co., 18 Am. & Eng.
Rd. Cas. 455.
Thus it is said in one case of a railway company, that it "is bound, as a
common carrier, when not over-crowded,
to take all proper persons who may apply
for transportation over its line, on their
complying with all reasonable rules of
the company. But it is not bound to
carry all persons at all times, or it might
be utterly unable to protect itself from
ruin. It would not be obliged to carry
one whose ostensible business might be
to injure the line : (Jencks v. Coleman, 2

Sumn. 221) ; one fleeing from justice ;
one going upon the train to assault a
passenger, commit larceny or robbery, or
for the purpose of interfering with the
proper regulations of the company, or
for gambling in any form, or committing
any crime ; nor is it bound to carry persons infected with contagious diseases, to
the danger of other passengers:" Thurston v. Union Pac. Pid., 4 Dill. 321 ; see
Pearson v. Dtane, 4 Wall. 605 ; Bennett
v. Dtton, 10 N. H. 481. Nor is a carrier bound to carry a drunken person, who
is in such a condition as to render it reasonably certain that by act or speech, he
will become offensive or annoying to
other passengers, even though he has not
committed any act of offence or annoyance: Vinton v. Aliddlesex Rd., 11
Allen 304 ; Pittsburgh, 4-c., Rid. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576.
So with reference to the transportation
of goods, the same principles are applicable in general. A common carrier is
bound to serve all alike, and carry all
goods which they carry that are tendered to them, and which they are able
to carry: Story on Bailment, sect. 508.
In speaking of the riaht to compensation it was said: "These charges, however, must be uniform ; that is,the
charge should be the same for all persons
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similarly situated, and forall freights of
a like kind and equality, for a given service. They may divide passengers-and
freights into classes, with descriptive distinctions, and charge different rates for
different classes for a given service, but
the charge should be uniform upon all
persons and freights embraced within each
class :" Chicago, 4-c., Rd. v. Parks, I&
Ill. 460; s. c. 68 Am. Dec. 562. In
another case it is said that "transportation by a common carrier is necessarily
open to the public upon equal and reasonable terms. An exclusive grant to one is
inconsistent with the rights of all others :"
Audenried v. P. 6-1R. Rd., 68 Penn. St.
370 ; a. c. 8 Am. Rep. 195.
This; standing indifferent between men
and men implies that the price charged
for transportation must also be an indifferent price; in other words, for the
same service at the same time and place,
under the same conditions, the same
price must be charged, and no inequality
of price can be insisted upon. This is
the current of authority in this country,
and it is declared to be the same at
common law: McDuffee v. Portland 4Rochester Rd., 52 N. H. 430; s- c. 13
Am. Rep. 72; Messenger v. Pennsylvania Rd., 36 N.J. L. 407; s. c. 13 Am.
Rep. 457; s. o. on appeal, 8 Vroom
531; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 754 ; New
England Express Co. v. Maine Cent.
Rd., 57 Me. 196; s. c.2 Am. Rep. 31 ;
Sandford v. Railroad (o., 24 Penn.
St. 378; s. c. 1 Am. Ry. Rep. 530.
In this country numerous statutes have
been passed, regulating fares and charges,
or providing that there shall he no unreasonable discrimination in fares, rates
or services between persons. These statutes have been almost universally held to
be only declaratory of the common law,
and as applying principles well known
before their passage: McDuffee v. Portland 4- Rochester Rd., 52 N. H. 430;
s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 72.
In England, however, it has been declared in a dictum that at common law,

there was no prohibition against unreasonable discrimination : Jiaxendale Y.
Eastern Counties Ry., 4 C. B. (N. S.)
63; but this case has not been accepted
in this country as an authority. In 1854
in that country was passed a statute concerning the regulation of railroad companies' charges, in which there was a
clause usually known us the " equality
clause." Under this statute the courts have
the right to make inquiry into unreasonable discrimination, both in accommodations and price charged, and many decisions have been rendered construing this
clause. But this clause has been accepted in this country as declaratory of
the common law ; and this is undoubtedly the true exposition of it.
The
courts of that country, not finding it
necessary to go beyond the words of the
statute, on any occasion, fell into the
error that there was no power at common
law to grant relief for unreasonable
discrimination, and came to regard this
statute as the onlylaw affording redress:
McDuffee v. Portland 6- Rochester Rd.,
supra.
These English cases may, therefore, be
regarded as authorities in this country
touching questions of unreasonable discrimination.
The cases are to the point that there
must be no "unreasonable discrimination." But "neither the service nor the
price is necessarily unreasonable because
unequal in a certain narrow, strict and
literal sense ; but that is not a reasonable
service, or a reasonable price, which is
unreasonably unequal. The question is
not merely, whether the service or price
is absolutely unequal in the narrowest
sense, but also whether the inequality is
unreasonable and injurious :" McDyffee
v. Portland 6- Rochester Rd., supra.
This is quite evident from the example
given in the case just quoted. Thus, a
charge of ten dollars for carrying a barrel
of flour for one merchant from A. to B.
may be a reasonable rate ; but to allow
the carrier to charge another merchant
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the same weight, carried over the same
route, at the same time, would be an unjust discrimination.
It cannot, it has been said, always be
accepted as a criterion that a charge is
too great or unjust from the fact that
another is not charged as much. As was
said by Justice CnomsTot to a plaintiff:
"The charging another person too little
is not charging you too much :" Garton
v. B. 4-E. Rd. Co., IB. & S. 112. In
the language used it was assumed that
the plaintiff had not paid an unreasonable. price, and this conclusion necessarily
settled the controversy. Suppose, however, "another person" had been charged
a full but reasonable price, then any
overcharge to the plaintiff would have
been an unreasonable charge. The
charging of one too little is only an
apparent discrimination.
"But if an
apparent discrimination is found to have
been a real one, the 4uestion is whether
it was reasonable, and if unreasonable,
whether the party complaining was
injured by it :" McDuffee v. Portland,
4-'c., Rd. Co., supra.
The subject we are discussing is well
illustrated by a New Jersey case. The
plaintiff sued the Pennsylvania Railroad
Company for overcharges, alleging that
in 1870 he entered into a contract with.
the company, to take effect January 1st,
1871, providing to transport hogs from
Chicago and Pittsburgh to Jersey City,
at the regular rates, allowing him a
drawback of twenty cents per hundred
pounds upon all hogs shipped from Chicago, and ten cents per hundred pounds
upon all hogs shipped from Pittsburgh ;
and if the company, after January 1st,
1871, should carry the same description
of freight for others, between the same
points, except seven named parties, at
less than their regular rates, or should
allow such others drawback, then it would
allow the plaintiff such further drawback
as would bring their freights twerty
cents per hundred and ten cents per
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hundred lower than the lowest. It was
averred by the plaintiff that he had
shipped twelve millions of pounds from
Chicago, and a like amount from Pittsburgh to Jersey City by the defendant's
road-; that he had paid the regular rates,
and had received the twenty cents and
ten cents drawback, but the company,
during the same year, carried for other
persons than those excepted in the contract, allowing such persons the same
drawback, or making a reduction in the
rates equal to the drawback, whereby
the plaintiff became entitled to have a
further drawback of twenty cents and
ten cents per hundred weight.
The court refused relief, and held the
contract void, on the ground that it was
"calculated to give an important advantage to, one dealer over other dealers,
* * * and that if the power to make
the present engagement exists, many
branches of business are at the mercy of
these companies," and therefore created
a monopoly, contrary to public policy.
It was said: "A merchant who can
transport his wares to market at a less
cost than his rivals, will soon acquire,
by underselling them, a practical monopoly of the business." " A person having
a public duty [as a common carrier] to
discharge, is undoubtedly bound to exercise such office for the equal benefit of
all, and, therefore, to permit the common
carrier to charge various prices, according
to the person with whom he deals, for
the same service, is to forget that he
oweis a duty to the community. If he
exacts different rates for the carriage of
goods of the same kind, between the
same points, he violates, as plainly,
though it may not be in the same degree,
the principle of public policy which, in
his own dispute, converts his business
into a public employment. The law
that forbids him to make any discrimination in Favor of the goods of A. over the
goods of B., when the goods of both are
tendered for carriage, must, it seems to
me, necessarily forbid any discrimination
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with respect to the rate of pay for the
carriage. I can see no reason why,
under legal rules, perfect equality to all
persons should be exacted in the dealings of the common carrier, except with
regard to the amount of compensation
for his services." Proceeding further,
the court touches on the subject of Justice CRompTox's remark; and says:
"The rules that the carrier shall reive
all the goods tendered, loses half its
value, as a politic regulation, if the cost
of transportation can be graduated by
special agreement, so as to favor one
party at the expense of others. Nor
could the defect in the law, if it existed,
be remedied by the principle which compels the carrier to take a reasonable hire
for his labor, because, if the rate charged
by him to one person might be deemed
reasonable, by charging a lesser price
to another for similar services, he disturbs that equality of right among his
employers which it is the endeavor of the
law to effect. Indeed, when a charge is
made to one person, and a lesser charge
for precisely the same offices to another,
I think it should be held that the charge
is not reasonable ; a presumption which
would cut up by the roots the present
agreement, or, by the operation of this
rule, it would be a promise founded on
the supposition that some other person is
to be charged more than the law warrants :" Messenger v. The Pennsylvania
Rd. Co., 7 Vroom 407; s. c. 13 Am.
Rep. 457 ; on appeal affirmed, 8 Vroom
531 ; s.c. 18 Am. Rep. 754, where it
was said: "A want of uniformity in
price for the same kind of service under
like circumstances is most unreasonable
and unjust, when the right to demand it
is common. It would be strange if,
when the object of the employment is the
public benefit, and the law allows no discrimination as to individual customers,
but requires all to be accommodated'
alike ss individuals, and for a reasonable
rate, thai by the indirect means of unequal prices some could get the advantage
of the accommodation and others not."

In another New Jersey case it was
held that an agreement not to allow to
others a drawback from established rates
on the transportation of merchandise,
which is allowed to the shipper, is against
public policy and void. But the agreement does not invalidate the entire contract if it is severable. The agreement
to allow the drawback to the shipper is
valid and enforceable, and others are
entitled to equally reasonable terms:
Stewart v. Lehigh Valley Rd. Co., 38
N. J. Law 505.
So, where a railroad company granted
the right to an express company to use a
part of its car, and denied the same
privileges to an individual, it was held
that the discrimination was unreasonable, and an action would lie against the
company for damages, even though the
preference was practised in another state,
if in violation of the law thereof:
McDuffee v. Portland4- Rochester Rd.,
52 N. H. 430; "s. o. 13 Am. Rep.
72 ; New EnglandExpress Co. v. Maine
Central Rd., 57 Me. 196; S. 0. 2
Am. Rep. 31; 9 Am. L. Reg. 728;
Sandford v. Catawissa, 6-c., Rd., 12
Harris 378. But the authority of this
case and many others is somewhat shaken
by a recent decision in the Supreme
Court of the United States, where it was
held that a railway company was not a
common, carrier of a common carrier,
nor bound to give it the same transportation it was bound to give to an individual. Three cases were decided at
once. Certain express companies had
been doing business upon certain railroads, under special written contracts,
and at the expiration of these contracts,
refused to continue the services. In the
lower courts they were compelled to continue the services by a mandatory injunction: Dinsmore v. Louisville, 4-c., Rd.,
3 Fed. Rep. 593; Southern Express
Co. v. Louisville, 4-c., Rd., 4 Fed.
Rep. 481; Southern Express Co. v.
Memphi,, 4-c., Rd., 10 Fed. Rep.
210 ; Southern Ezpress Co. v. Nashville,
4-c., By., 20 Am. L. Reg. 590. But,
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on appeal, this ruling was reversed ; and
it was held that the railway company
could lawfully refuse the express company transportation and assume itself
the carrying of express matter. Many
cases, therefore, in the federal courts fall
by this decision : Memphis,
Rd. v.
R-c.,
Southern Express Co., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.
542.
In Pennsylvania, a railroad company
refused to provide an express company
the usual facilities, and claimed the
privilege of carrying express itself. For
a "packed parcel" it claimed the privilege of charging, at the same rate, as if
each smaller parcel had been separately
shipped, and demanded from the express
company the same rate for transportation
over its road as it charged to those for
whom it performed the accessory service
of collection and delivery by horsepower. The express company, by injunction, sought to compel the railroad company to allow it "express facilities"
over the road, and to restrain the making
of overcharge in the transportation of
its freight. The injunction was refused,
principally upon the ground that the
railroad company had the right to engage
in the express business as accessory to
its business of carrying by rail; that it
was entitled to a monopoly of goods over
its rails ; and that the express company
were not entitled to special rates and
accommodations, such as it demanded.
But it was said that the company could
not charge for a "packed parcel" the
same rate as if each smaller parcel had
been separately shipped, nor could it
charge the express company for the
accessory service of collection and delivery by horse-power : Curablosv. Phila.
6-Reading Rd., 9 Phila. 411. Dismissed,
Dinsinorev. Phila. J. Reading Rd., 2 W.
N. C. 275. To the same effect is Sargent v. Boston 4- Lowell Rd., 115 Mass.
416.
In Ohio, the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company entered
into an agreement with the Standard Oil
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Company, on condition that the oil company would not remove its refinery and
works from Cleveland (which it was proposing to do, in order to secure a place
from which it could market its oil at a
less rate of transportation), to carry all
the oil shipped to the country through
which the railway ran, and beyond its
termini, for ten cents a barrel less than
the tariff rates established from time to
time. A further consideration for entering into the agreement was that the oil
company would ship by the railway
instead of storing in winter and shipping
in summer by water, as it was proposing
to do.
With this contract before it, the railway company laid switches and side
tracks and expended $100,000 in pre
paration for receiving the oil shipped in
bulk. The oil company furnished its
own tanks, which reduced the cost of
shipping and danger from fire. Under
this arrangement, the number of barrels
of oil shipped increased from 450,000 in
1875 to 742,000 in 1882, when the sui
was brought. This arrangement was
not exclusive, but was at all times open
to others, shipping a like quantity, and
furnishing a, like service and facilities ;
nor was it entered into with any intent
to injure the complainant; and the
latter, by an arrangement with the
Standard Oil Company, had shared in
these discriminating rates in shipping
his oil up to January 1st, 1880. Under
this arrangement, the railway company
carried nine-tenths of the oil company's
oil.
The complainant had $70,000 invested in a refinery, with a capacity of
150,000 barrels a year. His market
was substantially the same as that of the
Standard Oil Company; and he was the
principal competitor of the oil company.
If, therefore, he was compelled to pay
ten cents a barrel for the same carrying,
he would lose $15,000 a year; or, in:
other words, the Standard Oil Company
would receive $15,000 a year more for
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the same quantity of oil than the plaintiff. The contention of the latter was,
notthat he was charged a rate of comrpensation for transportation unreasonable in itself, but, by charging a lower
rate to his more favored competitor, the
latter was enabled to, and was, supply.
ing the market at a price with which he
could not competer and thus was driving
him out of the market, and destroying
the business he had built up.
The action was for an injunction to
restrain the railway company from
charging to and collecting from the
plaintiff rates and amounts in excess of
those charged the Standard Oil Company for like goods to the same point,
or from discriminating against him in
favor of the Standard, either upon its
own line, or on through freight over its
line and connecting points.
In the lower court the railway company was restrained as prayed, and on
appeal this decision was affirmed ; and
this, too, though the railroad extended
through several states. The grouhd of
the decision-was that the action of the railway company was an unreasonable discrimination between shippers; and one
that was contrary to public policy and
void at common law: Scofied v. Lake
Aore, 4-c.-, By., 3 N. E. R. 907.
It is no uncommon thing for railway
companies- to seek to avoid the rule requiring no unreasonable discrimination
in rates, by charging some more than
others, because of terminal facilities.
Thus in an Illinois case, a company contracted with certain elevator owners to
deliver to them at their elevators and
refuse to deliver to others. In order to
reach all these elevators the company had
to pass over tracks not their own and
pay tolls. Having refused to deliver to
the owner of an excluded elevator, he applied for a mandamus to compel a delivery
of grain to him at his elevator, and it was
granted. The ruling of the court was, that
although th company was not bound to
deliver at elevators ; yet having agreed to

do so for some it was compelled to do so for
all, without extra charge, or at the same
rate if a charge was made: Chicago, t-c.,
By. v. People ex rel. Bemipstead, 56 Ill.
365 ; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 690-; see Vincent
r. Railroad Co., 49-Id. 33; and Railroad
Co. v. People, 67 Id. 11. This was in
effect an eflbrt to make a regulation for
the conveyance of goods which in practice
affected a few individuals; and- in England it has been held that a regulation
which affected only one individual was
unreasonable: Crouch v. London 4- N..
W. Rd., 78 E. C. L. 254; Garton v.
Bristol,4-c., Rd., 95 Id. 641Suppose, however, a carrier, in order
to secure goods for transportation and
successfully compete with other carriers
from a certain point, lowers its rates from
that point -so that for a shorter distance
over the sameroutebut notin competition,
it charges a greater rate proportionally.
Is this unreasonable discrimination? In
one sense of the term it is, in another
not. At the competing points all shippers are served alike. At those points
where no competition exists, all shippers
are also-served alike. It, therefore, cannot be justly said that there is any unreasonable discrimination; for under like
circumstances all are served alike :
Ragan v. Aiken, 9 Lea 609 ; s. C. 42
Am. Rep. 684 ; 9 Am. & Eng. Railroad
Cas. 201 ; see Hers v. Northerr, kc.,
Rd., 74 Penn. St. 181; Atchison, 4-c.,
Rd. v. Dener, 4-c., Rd., IIOU. S. 667 ;
Ransome v. Eustern Counties By., I C.
B. (N. S.) 437 ; Munhalt v. Pennsylvania Rd., 92 Penn. St. 150; . c. 5
Am. & Eng. Railroad Cas. 337.
In one case the court went so far as
to- say that a carrier may charge less for
a long haul than for a short haul, when
there is competition between it and another road: Ex parte Koehler, 21 Am.
& Eng. 58; see Hays v. Pennsylvania
'Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 309.
But in Pennsylvania it was held that
though a carrier may have 'power under
special statutes to discriminate in its rates
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of charge between "local" and other
freights, yet it cannot make any discrimination on the ground that certain freight
is to be carried to its final destination by
another route after reaching the terminus
of the company's road,: Twells v. Pennsylvania Co., 3Am. L. Reg. (N. S.)728.
In the case cited from Tennessee, if
the complaining person bad shipped goods
from the same place the favored one did,
then there would have been an undue discrimination. In England a case arose
illustrating this question: E. was a
brewer at the town of B., where three
railways had their stations ; with one of
these railways, M., a certain brewer in
the town, had direct communication by
sidings which enabled goods to be sent
to the trains and taken from the trains
of railway Al. with greater ease and less
loss of time than by the way of ordinary
cartage. IM.charged them nothing for
cartage and made a rebate in the charge
for station to station conveyance. These
brewers had no such communication with
railway N. W., but it was often convenient for them to send by that railway;
and the directors of that railvay, in order
to compete with railwayM., allowed these
particular brewers the same advantages as
to the cartage and rebate as railway M.
did. As to all others in the same trade
(E. among the rest), the directors of
railway N. W. made the ordinary charge
for cartage, and allowed no rebate on the
charge for conveyance on the line. This
was held to be an inequality and an
undue preference within the meaning of
the "equality clause" of the statute.
Lord HATnERLEY said that" The charge
must be the same to all for the same services, performed in the same manner, for
carrying the goods for the same distance
and for similar services rendered in every
other way ; it [this] not being a case of
a wholesale charge compared with a retail
charge and the like, which would be a
difference of circumstances, and has
been decided to be an essential difference." There was an attempt made to
VOL. XXXI.-58
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distinguish the word "tolls," as applicablt
to railway rates after the goods to be
shipped were delivered at the station, and
that the "equality" clause only applied
to these rates and not to cartage from
station to station.
Lord BLAcxnBuw
said of this: "I think it is quite clear
that when the charge from station to
station and a shilling are both together
paid, by one person for the whole service
performed by the railway company including the cartage, when the amount of
the tolls (supposing them to be exclusive
of the cartage), and an added shilling
are charged to one person, and to another
person the same tolls (again treating
them as exclusive of the cartage) are
charged, and a shilling's worth of cartage is thrown in gratis, and not charged
for, the latter person gets his goods carried upon the railway at a cheaper rate.
Whether the shilling ispart of the "toll"
or not I do not care. In that case there
is an inequality ; there is a difference in
the amount charged for carriage upon the
railway which is what the legislature intended to prevent :" London 4- N. W.
Ry. v. Evershed, House of Lords, 3 Appeal Cases 1029 ; s. o. 24 Moak 625 ;
same case in 2 Q. B. Div. 254, and in
the Court of Appeal, 3 Q. B. Div. 135,
decided in the same way, In these cases
the plaintiff having for a long time paid
the money in ignorance of the discriminating rate, and part of it at the last,
underprotest, it was held that le was entitled to recover the *overcharge in an
action for money had and received. In
another English case the railway company
refused to receive from the plaintiff, a collier, less than fifteen loads at a time, while
itr
eceived from others a far less number
of loads at a time. The refusal of the
company had the effect to add much to the
cost of the plaintiff's shipping. This was
held to be an unreasonable discrimination: Lancashire, 4-c., Ry. v.

Gidlow,

L. R., 7 H. L. 517 (1875); s. c. 13
Moak 40.
Lord HATHERLEY, in London 4.N. W.
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ly. v. Evershed, supra, refers to a case
of "wholesale charge" and says the rule
governing it, differs from that governing
a "retail charge." This rule is that a
carrier may discriminate in rates in favor
o? persons shipping large quantities of
freights over those shipping small quantities. In Scofield's Case, in Ohio, already
alluded to, the court seems to have disregarded the rule or not followed it;
but that was an instance of a discriminating rate between "wholesale" shippers,
and not between a " wholesale" and
"retail" shipper, although the difference
in the amount of the shipments was very
great. In the New Hampshire case,
already referred to (McDuffee's Case),
it was intimated that such a difference
might not be an unreasonable discrimination ; but in another case from the same
state, the exact point has been decided.
It was said : " The expense of handling, carrying and storing the smaller
amount is much greater, po rata, than
that of the same operation upon the
larger amount in one body, and a discrimination in favor ofthe larger dealer is
not inequality, but reasonable equality:"
Concord, &c., Rd. v. Forsaith, 59 N. H.
122; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 181; see
Ransome v. Eastern Counties Ry., I C.
B. (N. S.) 437. The courts, however,
are not inclined to permit the carrier to
have a separate charge for every one
shipping over its route, according to the
amount shipped. The tendency is to
require them to divide shippers, in their
charges, into two classes, wholesale and
retail, and allow them to charge separate
rates as to each class, but not separate
rates for each hipper of any one class.
Just where the line to distinguish between
a wholesale and retail shipper is to be
drawn, is not clear ; but it is a matter
of practice or custom: Ransome v. Eastern Counties Ry., supra.
There is no rule that requires a comImon carrier to charge the same rate for
all classes of goods. He may, for those
goods having qualities which affect the

risk and expense of carriage, charge a
greater sum than for those where the
risk or the expense of shipment, is not
so great. In order that there may be a
greater charge, there must be a difference of service rendered, or of circumstances in respect of their passage over
the rails ; see Great Western Rd. v.
Sutton, L. R., 4 H. L. Cas. 226; London, 6c., Ry. v. Evershed, supra; Nicholson v. Great Western Ky., 5 C_ B.
(N. S.) 366.
In Scofield's Case, from Ohio, we have
already seen that a threat to use another
mode of shipment is no excuse for
granting a special privilege ; nor is it an
excuse that such action buys off a rival
interest : Oxiade v. NortheasternBly., 1
C. B. (N. S.) 454. Thus,- where a
coal company threatened to construct a
road for the shipping of its own coal,
unless the railroad company gave them
lower rates than others, it was held no
excuse for granting the coal company
special rates: Harrisv. Cockermouth, 4-c.,
Ry., 3 C. B. (N. S.) 693 ; nor can special rates be justified in order to put him
on an equality with another having a
better natural situation, so as to equalizethem, or put them- on an equal footing when they reach a market: Ransom"
v. Eastern CountiesRy., 4 C. B. (N. S.)
135.
A carrier cannot, by adding to its
regular business of carrying, an outside
business, grant unreasonable discriminations to its patrons of both businesses.
Thus, a carrier formerly charged a uniform rate of 3s. 6d. per ton on all goods
conveyed on its line between A. andB.
The goods were collected and delivered
both by the company and by C., at a
charge of 4s. 10d. per ton. The carrier
had no power to impose rates for delivering, but raised the charge for carrying
to 8s. 4d., being the aggregate of the
above charges, with an intimation to the
public that they would collect and deliver goods free of charge. The real
object of this arrangement was to com-
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pel person& desiring to- have their goods,
conveyed by the- carrier to emplby it to
collect and- deliver their goods, and thus
secure this business and the profits upon
it, as well as to exclude B. from competing with them in- this department of
business. The courts held that this was
an undue preference in the company in
their separate capacity of carrier other
than on the lines of railway, and also an
undue prejudice to B. The ground of
the decision. was that where a company
carries on some other business, they must,
in respect of such business, be taken to
be in the position of third parties: Baxendale v- Great Western Ry., 29 L. X.
C. P. 81 B. c. 5- G-B, (NT/.S.Y. 336.
See Baxendale v. Southwestern BY., II
Exch. L- R., 37 ; Baxendale v. Great
Western Ry.,A6 Q- B. (N. S.) 13T;
Diphwys Casson State Co- v. TestiogBy., 32 L- T. (N. S.) 271.
Where a company conveyed goods
from a certain point to another point
over its own line and that of another
company, at a certain rate, if they were
consigned by and to its own agent at
those- places, but if consigned: through
any one else it charged a greater rate, it
was held to be an unreasonable preference: Baxendale v. North Devon By.,
3C.B. (N. So 324.
Likewise if a company carries on a
separate business from carrying, and
accounts to itself for the value of the
services rendered, it must carry at the
same rate as it does for outsiders: Baxendale v. Great Western Ry., 28 L. J.
C. P. 81; s. 0. 5 C. B. (N. S.) 336.
The "equality clause" in the English
statute provides that the tolls charged by
railway companies for the carriage of
goods shall be charged equally to all personq and after the same rates in respect
of all goods of the same description,
"passing only over the same portion of
the line of railway," and that no reduction or advance in any such tolls shall be
made, either directly or indirectly, in
favor of or against any particular per-
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son using the railway. A railway-company carried- coal- to- a point upon itsrailway from a group of collieries placed
along the line- at varying distances from,
that point, and charged tolls at one rate
per ton in respect of such carriage to- all
the members of the group. In an action
for overcharges by the owner of the
colliery lying nearest to the point of
carriage, it was held that the company
had committed a breach of the statute,
which applied, notwithstanding that the
termini of the transit over the company'sline- from the group to the point of
carriage diffiered with respect- to each
colliery: Manchester, ft., By. v. Denaby
Main Colliery-Co., L. R., I3 Q. B. Div.
674s; s.c. 18-Am. & Eng. Rd. Cas.
482. See Lotspeick v. Central-Rd., 73
Ara. 306;s. c. 18 Am. & Eng. Rd.
Cas; 490In Engran& a carrier may enter into
a contract with an individual which, by
reasorr of the special facilities- of' that
individual cannot be made by any other
person. : or instance: A. may be in
such a condition that he cam enter into a
contract with a carrier for the shipment
of a million tons annually, at a. special
low rate, and no other shipper can secure
the same terms, for the reason he cannot
furnish the same amount: EversKed vLondon 6- N. TV. By., L.R., 3 Q. B.
Div. 135. Nor is it a violation of the
law in that country to allow a special
rate to those who can furnish at one time
a very large amount, or a train load;
although no other person can do so:
ZicVhoon v. Great Western By., 5 C. B.
(N. S.) 366: Greenop v. Southeastern
By., 20 Sol. Jour. 830. See Foreman
v. GreatEastern By., 19 Sol. .our. 774.
It is a common practice for a railroad
company to charge those who pay their
fare on the train more than those who
purchase tickets for the same trips. This
cannot be construed as an unreasonable
discrimination. It is such a rule or regulation as a company has a right to make,
and one which serves all alike who choose
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to obey ir: Chicago, 4-c, Rd. v. Parks, burse himself by charging others more
18 Ill. 460; 6&Am. Dec. 562; St. Louis than the reasonable price, he is illegally
6-c., Rd. v. Dalby, 19 I1. 353; &ephen administering, not his own, but other
v. Srmth, 29 Vt. 160-; St. Louis, &c., people's charity. And when he attempts
Rd. v. South, 43 Ill. 176 ; Toledo, 4-c., to justify an instance ofapparent-discrimiRy-' r. Wright, 68 Ind. 586 ; s. c. 34 nation on the ground of charity, it may
Am. Rep. 277 ; Crocker v. New London, be necessary to ascertain whose charity
6-c., Rd., 24 Conn. 249 ; Porterv. New was dispensed-whether it was his, orYork, ffc., Rd., 34 Barb. 353 - Bor- one forced by him from others, including
deaux v. Erie Rd., 8 Hun. 579 ; State the party complaining of it :" MicDuffee
v. Choin, 7 Ia. 204 ; Dus Laurans v. v. Porttand, 4-c., Rd., 52 N. H. 430 ; s.
St. Paul, 6-c., Rd., 15 Mian. 49 ; Indian- c. 13 Am. Rep. 72.
apolis, 6-c., R. v. Rinard, 46 Ind. 293;
Money paid under protest for exces.Jeffersonville, 4-c., Rd. v. Rogers, 38 Id. sive charges, or ignorantly, may be
116; s. o. 28 Id. 1; Hilliardv. Goold, recovered back. To this there is scarcely
34 N. H. 230 ; State v. Goold; 53 Me. any dissent: W. Va. Trans. Co. v.
279.
Sweetzer, 25 W. Va. 134 ; Waterman v.
The requirement that there must be no Chicago, 4-c., Rg., 61 Wis. 464; S. C.
unreasonable discrimination between pas- 50 Am. Rep. 145 London, -4-c., By.
sengers does not prevent a carrier carry- v. Erershed, supra; Peters v. Railroad,
ing persons or property through. charity 42 Ohio St. 275; s. c. 51 Am. Rep.
free of charge. "A person who is a 814. Nearly all the cases hold that it is
common carrier may devote to the needy, a question of law upon the facts proven,
in. any necessary form of relief, all the whether the charge is an unreasonable
reasonable profits ofhis business. - He.has discriminating one; but in Texas it is
the same rightthat any one else has togive held to be a question of law and fact
money or goods or transportation to the whether it is unjust .-Houston, 6-c., Rd.
poor. But it is neither his legal duty to v. Rust, 58 Tex. 98; s. c. 9 Am. &
be charitable at his own expense, nor his Eng.Rd. Cas. 123.
leg4 rigbtto be charitable at the expense
But the authoritieswe have been citing
of those whose servant heis. If his reason- are not always followed.
Thus, in
able compensation for certain carriage is Florida, it is held that a common carrier
$100, and his just profit, not needed in is bound to carry for a reasonable comhis business, is one-tenth of that sum, he pensation, but-is not bound to carry at
has $10 which he may legally use for the same price for all. It was a case
feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, where fifty cents more per thousand' feet
or carrying those in poverty, to whom for transporting lumber was charged the
transportation is one of the necessaries plaintiff by a rimlroad-company, than was
oflife, and who suffer for lack of it. But charged another party for the, same serif he charges the $10 to those who pay vice. Suit was brought to recover the
him for their transportation, if he charges difference, and it was-held that the plainthem $10 for $100 worth of service, he tiff was not entitled to recover: J.ohnson
ii not benevolent himself, but he is under- v. Pensacola, 4-c., Rd., 16 Fla. 623; s.
taking to compel those to be benevolent c. 26 Am. Rep. 731 ; see Eclipse Towwho are entitled to his service ; he is Boat Co. v. Pontchartrain Rd., 24 La.
violating the common right of reasonable, Ann. 1. In South Carolina the same
terms, which cannot be evaded by com- conclusion was reached upon a contract
pulsory contributions for any charitable exactly like the New Jersey rebate conpurpose. So if he carries one or many tract, and a recovery allowed for a refor half the reasonable price, and re-im- fusal to repay the rebate. This case is
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exactly paraller wfth, Stewart-v. Lehdih
YValley Rd., 38 N . J Law 505; where. a
recovery was also allowed; but the two
cases proceed in directions diametrically
opposite.; one that it is a valid contract
in all instances, the other that it operates
as a lowering of rates to alt- customers,
and. for that reason fs valid : Ex parte
Bensn, i8-S C. 38 ; s. c. 44 A. Rep.
564In 1859, a case arose in Massachusetts
concerning discriminating rates, in which
it was held that a common carrier is not
bound to transport goods for all persons
at the same rates; but may give speciaI
rates to whomsoever it will- so long as
its other customers, under exactly the
same circunstances, are charged a-reasonitchburg Rd. v Gage, r2
able rate :
Gray: 393This study of the various cases necessarily shows much discrepancy- in them.
The remark of Justice Cnoatpvo ;, while
often cited, is not followed irt principle
very often. 'While it is- conceded that
carriers maycharge a reasonable price,
and' it is often. said that the charging of
one too little iWnot the chargingofanother
too much, but only evidence of it ;-yet
the courts are very much inclined, where
all things are equa4 to require the carrier to carry for all at the lowest rate he
charges any one customer; and- if he
charges a greater rate, tor compel him to
refund. This is particularly true of the
Ohio and-New Jersey cases. So, in many
of the English: cases it is said that the
interests- of the carrier must always be

considered-in-determining whether irhas
discriminatedin favor of one totheinjury
of another - and three cases- are cited fn.
this-country upon this point; butit must
be obvious that this is true only in alimited sense. For w-carrier may he
charging all customers such a rate that
he is only making a fair profit- on the
capital, invested; ant also charge a single
customer, in order-to favor him, a lower
rate, or the cost of the transportationalone, or even below that, whereby the
latter is peculiarly favored and enriched
by being able-to monopolizethe trade, at
the expense of'his competitors in trade.
Insuch an instance, to require the carrier to charge the favored customer the
regular rates is obviously beyond the
power of a court of chancery; and' to
compel it to~carry for all at this favored
rate is ruinous to it,
audi violative of the
statement that the interests of the road
must be always borne- in mind. The
real solution of this question, if the-courts
undertake at all to interfere,is, to compel the carrier to carry for all, at the
same rate it carries for the favored cs,tomer ; and ifthat is ruinous, the managers.of the carrier company have only
themselves to blame for having shown
and given unfair rates to a customer.
One priceto allmust-be the motto, everything else equaTe or, in other words, the
same profit for the labor performed, must
be made out of the carrying done for each
individual.
W. W. TnomeroN.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
SEMON v. TERHUNE.
A mortgage recorded after the deed to the mortgagor, although it is dated before
it, is-notice to a subsequent purchaser from the mortgagor. The date may be due
to a mistake, and the record is enough to put a prudent man on inquiry.
A mortgagor who pays the bond after the property has been sold under foreclosure
and the proceeds of the land have become the primary fund for the payment, is
entitled to subrogation, and the mortgage is not extinguished by- the payment.
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FnrAL hearing on bill to foreclose and- answer.

-9. A. & W. T Day, for complainant.
J Garrick, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RuNyoN, C.-This suit is brought to foreclose a mortgage dated
and acknowledged September 17th 1880, and recorded on the
15th of October following, given by the defendants John G. Semon
and wife to Richard M. Johnson, upon lands in Jersey City,
to secure the payment of $750, and interest, according to the condition of Semon's bond to Johnson. The bill states that the mortgage was given for purchase-money on the sale of the mortgaged
premises by Johnson to Semon, but the fact is not admitted by the
answer. . The deed to Semon was dated September 30th 1880, was
acknowledged October 1st 1880, and recorded on the 24th of
November following.
The bill states that while the date of
the mortgage is prior to that of-the deed, the mortgage was not
delivered until the time of the delivery of the deed; but this is not
admitted by the answer. Johnson assigned the mortgage February
9th 1881, to James M. Connor, by assignment of that date,
recorded February 16th 1881. On the 2d of June 1884, James
M. Connor assigned it to James P. Connor, executor, &c., of WilC. Connor, deceased, and he assigned it September 4th 1884, to the
complainant. When John G. Semon bought the property of Johnson it was incumbered by a mortgage for $1000, given September
10th 1886, by William Nattrass, who then owned the premises, to
Jane C. Vreeland. That mortgage came to the hands of Jacob 0.
Terhune by assignment. He died June 15th 1882. His executors
were the defendant John V. H. Terhune and Peter Schoonmaker.
September 27th 1882, they filed a bill in this court to foreclose that
mortgage. The only defendants to that suit were John G. Semon
and his wife. There was a final decree in that suit by default. It
was entered February 5th 1883, and the execution was issued
thereon for the sale of mortgaged premises, which under it were
sold May 3d 1883, to John V. H. Terhune for $500, and & deed
therefor was given to him by the-sheriff. He took possession under
his deed, and has been in possession ever since. The bill asks that
an account be had with him, and that the property be sold to pay
in the first place to him the amount which may be found to be due
to him in respect of the first mortgage, and then to pay the com-
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plainant what may he found to be due to him on his mortgage, with
costs, and that any balance of the proceeds of the sale be paid to
Terhune. Terhunei by- the answer, admits the making-and recording of the compIainantes mortgage, and- states that the omissiorv to
make the holder thereof a, party to the foreclosure suitupon the first
mortgage was due to the fact that the record of the complainant's
mortgage was indexed in awrong place. The answer further alleges
that in 1884 the then holder- of the complainant's mortgage
threatened to sue John- G. Semon for the money due upon the bond,
and that the latter then paid it, and took an assignment of the bond
and mortgage to complainant, who has no interest in them, but
holds them for the use and benefit of John G. Semon, and subject
to his control. The complainant filed no replication, and the cause
comes on for hearing upon bill and answers;
The foreclosure proceedings upon the firstmortgage were a nullity
as to the holders of the second mortgage. By his purchase at the
sheriff's sale under them, Terhune obtained the title of the holdersof the first mortgage, and the equity of redemption of John G.
Semon and his wife, but that equity of redemption was subject to
the payment of the second mortgage, if that mortgage was a valid
lien, of which the purchaser at the sheriff's sale had notice, upon
the property; and if that mortgage were such a lien, and Terhune
had taken an assignment of it after his purchase, equity would not
have permitted him to enforce payment from Semon of the bond
which it was given to secure, without giving Semon the benefit of a
resort to the proceeds of the sale of the premises after satisfying the
first mortgage therefrom - Vanderkemp v. Shelton, 11 Paige 28.
The only question on this point in this case is whether the purchaser
had notice ; that is, whether he had construct.ve notice from the
records. Had he consulted the record (the index is no part of it),
he would have discovered that the title to the mortgaged premises
remained in Richard M. Johnson up to, September 30th 1880, and
that, by a deed of that date, Johnson conveyed them to John G.
Semon, who, by a mortgage recorded after, although dated before
that date, mortgaged them to Johnson. The fact that the mortgage bears date prior to the date of the deed would not, under tho
circumstances, have justified the purchaser in concluding that it was
given before Semon acquired title, for it might have been due to a
mistake in the date of the one instrument or the other. There was
at least enough upon the record to put him as a prudent man upon
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inquiry. He bad notice of the mortgage from the record ; for, in
searching for mortgages by Semon from the date of his deed, September 30th 1880, he would have found the mortgage. The
doctrine of the cases of Lo8ey v. Simp8on, 11 N. J. Ekq. 246, andSpeilman v. ifeist, 36 Id. 199, is not at variance with that now
enunciated. The doctrine of those cases is that one who proposed
to purchase land, or to take a mortgage upon it, is not bound to
take notice of the record of a conveyance or mortgage made by one
whose title deed has not been recorded, and the reason is that he
bis no clue to guide him in searching the record. But here the
record showed the searcher the deed to Semon, and his mortgage to
his grantor. The mortgage was indeed dated before the date of
the deed, but it was recorded after the latter date, and the deed
itself was on record. It is urged that, according to the record, it
appears that after Semon gave the mortgage to Johnson, the latter
conveyed the property to him by deed of a subsequent date, and so
extinguished the mortgage ; for, according to the dates of the instruments, Semon bad no title, when he mortgaged to Johnson, and,
having no title, he mortgaged the property to the person who owned
it. The inference from the condition of the record would be that
there was some mistake in the dates, and that in fact Johnson conveyed to Semon and then Semon mortgaged to him ; or that Semon
mortgaged to Johnson before he acquired title, and, having acquired
title, afterwards might be estopped from denying that the mortgage
was valid. The record was notice of the mortgage, But it is urged
that if Terhune is chargeable with notice, Semon is entitled to no
relief, because, according to the answer which is to be taken as true
upon this hearing, he himself paid off the bond, the payment of
which the mortgage was given to secure, and the bond was his own.
But if the land had, as between him and the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, become the primary fund for the payment of that mortgage, he is entitled to subrogation on paying it off (as he was compelled to do), because of his personal liability thereon. The value
of the premises beyond what was necessary to pay the first mortgage
was the primary fund to pay the second mortgage ( Fanderkemp v.
Shelton, ubi supra), and, under the circumstances, he is entitled to
subrogation: Stillman's EZ'r8. v. Stillman, 21 N. J. Eq. 126;
Faulk&v. Dimock, 27 Id. 65 ; fNce v. Annin, 2 Johns. Ch. 125;
Jumel v. Jumel, 7 Paige 591; Russell v. Allen, 10 Id. 249.
There will be a decree for an account by Terhune of the rents
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and profits from the time of the delivery of the sheriff's deed to- him,
in which account he is to be allowed for lawful taxes and assessmeats paid by him, and for moneys paid for necessary repairs
Should there be- a balance against him on such accounting, it is-to
be credited on the amount due upon the first mortgage. Should
the balancebe in his favor, he is to have it as well as the amount
due to him in respect to the first mortgage raised and paid to him
out of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged premises before
paying the second mortgage therefrom. There will also be an
account of what is due upon the first and second mortgages, and the
property will be sold to raise and pay in the first place to Terhune,
the amount found to be due upon the first mortgage, after crediting
any balance of rents and profits which may be found against him;
and. if any balance is found in his favor, he is to have the amount
of it paid to him, as before stated, out of the proceeds of sale before
payment of the second mortgage. He is not to have the costs of
the foreclosure proceedings upon the first mortgage, nor the execution costs in that case; Jian Duyne v- Shann, 39 N. J'. Eq. 6.
There will then be paid to the complainant the amount found due
upon the second mortgage, with the cost of this suit, and the surplus
if any, will be paid to Terhune.
The right of subrogation is a creationof equity, and' has no application to an
action at law, as in eceetment : MJe
11er r.
Xiatenye, 106 Ill. 414. It is not forreal or technical, but its object is esseniaily to promote justice. It cannot be
invoked if inequitable to do so, or if
there is unreasonable delay: Gerrish v.
B~ragg, 55 Vt. 829. In its early history it was applied only in favor of tho'e
who were bound by the original security
with the principal debtor. As equitable
ria..its developed, its application has been
greatly extended, ani, it may be stated
generally, thnt it is now applied in favor
of all persons Mho are required to pay
the debt of another, tor the protection
,)f thir own intcrc-ts.
The most common instance, where the

secured by a deed of trust upon the
premises as a part of the pnrchasemoney, to-protect his own property from
sale, he will be subrogated to the lien
of the deed of trust, as against an intervening lien of the grantor. Here the
payment is not voluntary, as if made by
a stranger, but is made by the purchaser
to protect his own interest in the property. And in such case, a court of
equity will keep- alive the lien in his
favor, notwithstanding it has been formally released without his knowledge
and consent: Iudson v. Dismukes, 77
Va. 242, 247 ; Gatewooda v. Gatwood,
75 Id. 407 and cases ; ntng v. MJorqan,
89 I1. 199, 203. Sec Lynch v. lioncock, 14 S_ C. 66, 84; IkcCormick7 v_
rwin, 3s Ienn. St. 111, 117 ; Cl'rk

,doctrince of subro,_,ationl is applli..,I, is in

v.

the ca c of purchasers of the equity of
redemption, with or without notice of
existing liens. Thus, when a purchaser
of land pays off a debt of his grantor

Hun (N. Y.) 411: Dtarnes v. jlott,
64 N. Y. 397 ; Orrick v. Durham, $9
Mo. 174, 179 ; Bryson v. Close, 60 Ia.
357.

Vo.

XXXIV.-59

.ark-'in,

95 N. Y. 346; s. c. 310
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A party who advances money to another
that is used to discharge a valid pre-existing lien on real estate, if not a mere
volunteer, is entitled, by subrogation, toall remedies which the original lienholder possessed as against the property :
Edwards v. Davenport, 20 Fed. Rep.
756, 726.
In Cottrell's Appeal, 23
Penn. St. 294, 295, A. obtained judgment against B. To prevent sale upon
execution, B. gave A. his note, with C.
as security ; C. paid the note and obtained an assignment of the judgment
from A., and claimed payment out of
proceeds of sale of B.'s real estate upon
judgment obtained by D. against B. subsequently to A.'s judgment: Held, that
he was entitled to subrogation. The
court stated the doctrine thus: "When
one not a mere volunteer discharges the
debt of another, he is entitled to all the
remedies which the creditor possessed
against the debtor. Actual payment
discharges a judgment or other encumbrance at law, but where justice requires
it we keep it afoot in equity for the
safety of the paying securities."
In Mosier's Appeal, 56 Penn. St. 76,
80, numerous judgments were entered
against two debtors, some joint and some
several; executions were issued and the
land held jointly levied on. The court ordered the undivided interest of one of the
debtors to be sold separately. A junior
judgment creditor, believing that the
land would be sacrificed, after the execution plaintiffs had refused to assign
their judgments to him on payment, paid
the executions to the sheriff and satisfaction was entered. No other liens having
intervened, he was subrogated to the
tights of the execution plaintiffs, and the
satisfaction cancelled. The court very
clearly states the rule that subrogation
"will not arise in favor of a stranger,
but only in favor of a party who on some
sort of compulsion discharges a demind
against a common debtor. For instance,
a surety who pays the debt of his principal, will be entitled to the security of the

creditor; so, where one of several joint
sureties has paid the whole debt, he will
be entitled to the judgment to enforce
contribution by his co-sureties. * * *
The principles of subrogation do not
apply in favor of a volunteer. * * *
They can obtain the right of substitution
only -by contract. * * * I regard the
doctrine as applicable in all cases where
payment has been made under a legitimate and fair effort to protect the ascertained interests of the party paying, and
when intervening rights are not legally
jeopardized or defeated."
Stranger cannot invoke thedoctrine o]
subrogation.-Courtsuniformly recognise
the rule that a mere stranger or volunteer,
who, in the absence of agreement, pays
a debt for which another is bound, and
which he was under no obligations to
pay, cannot invoke the doctrine of subrogation: Hough v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
57 Ill. 319 ; Conradv. Buck, 21 W.Va.
396, 408; Dixon on Subrogation 163,
164, et seq. Thus, where one advances
money to another to enable him therewith
to make a loan to a third party on the
security of an equitable mortgage, he is
not entitled to subrogation, merely on the
ground that he so advanced the money:
Van Winkle v. Williams, 38 N. J. Eq.
105. Or where a third party, under no
legal oblizations, furnishes money to
another to redeem from a judicial sale,
where the advancement was not made
under the belief or expectation that he
would succeed to the rights of the party
to whom it was so advanced, but under
a belief that a mortgage would be executed to secure him, and contracted to
that effect, the principles of subrogation
will not apply. The party is simply
considered asan intermeddler: Wormer v.
WaterlooAgr. Works, 62 Iowa 699, 702.
In Kitchell v. Mudgett, 37 Mich. 81,
85, 86, a third party paid off and discharged the first
two of three mortgages
- on certain real estate, and took a new
mortgage for the amount paid. He was
under no obligations to pay the mortgage
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debt. It was held that his mortgage was
subsequent to the one- left unpaid, and
that lie was- not entitled to be subrogated
to the rights of the first tw. mortgagees.
Conventional subrogation arises by contract in favnr of tlird persons, not parties
to the original obligation ; as where one
furnishes money with an agreement that
it shall be used in discharging a debt due
for the purchase of land, and it is so
used, with an understanding that lie who
advances it shall have the same remedies
to recover the money thus loaned that
the original vendor was entitled to for
the enforcement of his demand, and the
lender is suhrogatcd to the rights of the
vendor of the land: IWarhmiuni v. Mferritt, 60 Tex. 24, 27 1 see Baldwin v.
OoTet, 94-N. Y. 82; Seward v. Hwitington, 94 Id. 104.
In Shinn v. Budd, 14 N. J. Eq. 234,
a third party paid off a mortgag on certain real estate and claimed subrogation.
He was under no obligations to, make
payment, and it was made without agreement or understanding that he was to be
substituted. His bill was denied. GREENz,
Chancellor, observed (p. 236), "Subrogation as a matter of right as it exists in
the civil. law, from which- the term has
been borrowed and adopted in our own,
is never applied to aid a mere volunteer.
Legal subrogation into the rights of a
creditor for the benefit of a third person,
takes place only for his benefit, who being
himself a creditor, satisfies the lien of a
prior creditor, or for the benefit of a purchaser who extinguishes the incumbrance
upon the estate, or of a co-obligor or
security who discharges the debt or of
an heir who pays the debts of the suecess.on," citing Code Napoleon, book 3,
lit. 3, art. 1251 ; CivilCodeof La., art.
2157 ; 1 Pothier on Oblig., part 3, ch.
1, art. 6, 6. "We are ignorant, says
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, of any
law which gives to the party who furnishes money for the payment of a debt
the right of the creditor who is thus paid ;
tlh. legal claim alone belongs not to all

who pay a debt, but only to him, who,
being bound for it, discharges it .Nolte
d- Co. r Dier Creditors, 7 Mar. (N. S.)
602 ; Curds v. KiTtchen, E It. 706 ; Cox
v. Baldwin, I Miller, St. Louis R. 147.
The principles of legal subrogation as
adapted to and applied in our system of
equity, has,-it is believed, been rigidly
restrained within these limits."
In The Bank of tle U. S. v- llinston's
Executors, 2 Brocken. lep. 254, C. J.
MAxSIALL said: "If a security not
assignable be discharged by a surety,
whom it binds, equity keeps it in force
in his favor and puts such surety in place
of the original creditor. But I think
there is no case in which this has been
done in favor of a person, not bound by
the original security, who discharges the
debt as a volunteer.'"
In Gadsden v. Brown, I Speer's Eq.
37 (S. C.). Jon-iso., Chancellor, said :
"The doctrine of subrogation is a pure
unmixed equity, and from its very nature
could not have been intended for the
relief of those who were in a condition
and at liberty to elect whetherthey would
or would not be bound, and so far as I
have been able to learn its history, it
never has been so applied. It has been
directed exclusively to the relief of those
who were already bound, and who could
not but choose to abide the penalty. I
have seen no case in which a stranger
who was in a condition to make terms
for himself, and demand any security he
might require, has been protected by the
principle."
In Sanford v. McLean, 3 Paige Ch.
(N. Y.) 122, Chancellor WALWOITH
states the principle with great clearness :
"It is only in cases where the person
advancing money to pay the debt of a
third party stands in the situation of
a surety, or is compelled to pay it to protect his own rights, that a court of equity
substitutes him in the place of the creditor
as a matter of course without any agreement to that efiect.
In other cases the
demand of a creditor, which is paid with
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the money of a third person, and without
any agreement that the security shall be
assigned or kept on foot for- the benefit
of such third person, is absolutely extinguished:r see In re Schaller, 10 Daly
(N. Y.) 57 ; Clark v. Moore, 76 Va.
262.
In Chldress Y_ Allen, 3 La. R 477,
it is held that the purchaser of land seized
and exposed to sale on an execution
issued upon a judgment by which the
debt is discharged, is not entitled to be
subrogated to the rights of the judgment
creditor. Such an act, said the court,
cannot be distinguished from payment
made to the creditors without a sale of
the debtor's property, by a person not
having an interest to discharge the debt.
Subrogation does not arise in favor of a
purchaser on a forced sale.
In the recent case of Nash v. Taylor,
83 Ind. 347, 351, an assessment was
levied upon certain land for street improvements in favor of the contractor,
who did the work on the street. The
owner of the land borrowed the money
from Nash with which to discharge the

lien, which attached to hisland by virtue
of the levy. The money was used for
this purpose ; Nash sought to be subrogated, to the rights of the contractor,
which was denied. The court remarked,
"Here there is nothing more than the
loan of money by one neither in privity
of blood nor of contract or estate, withthe person who claims the lien which
is sought to be displaced by the lender.
There was no colorable obligation on the
part of Nash to pay the street assessment, nor did he do so; neither did he
intend to pay it. The case is, therefore,
easily discriminated from one in which a
party discharges a lien un-er a colorable
obligation, or pays it, expecting to derive
some benefit from it." See further,
Railroad v. Facney, 78 I1. 116 ; Kelly
v. Receiver of Green Bay, 4-c., Rd., 10
Biss. C. C. R. 151; Duncan et al. v.
Railroad,2 Wood C. C. 542 ; Blair v.
St. Louis H. 6- K. Rd., 23 Fed. Rep.
521; Binford v. Adams, 3 N. E. Rep.
(S. C. Ind.) 753.
B. E. BLACK.

San Francisco, Cal.

Court of Errors and Appeals of Ifaryland.
PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INS. CO. v. ADLER.
In marine insurance, if an article is injured by reason of its own inherent tendencies ; as, for example, by spontaneous combustion, and these tendencies are not
called into activity by any perils insured against, the insurer is not liable.
Whether the same rule applies in an ordinary contract of fire insurance, quCere.

APPEAL from Superior Court, Baltimore city.
John B. Kenly, for appellant.
T. P.

7ark, for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STONE, J.-The plaintiffs shipped, by a line of steamers running
from New York to the south, a quantity of oil-cloth clothing to
Louisiana and Texas. They insured this clothing, before shipment,
in the office of the defendant company. The clothing was packed
in boxes, and on its arrival at its destination it was found injured
and comparatively worthless, either by spontaneous combustion, or

PROV!DENCE WASHINGTON INS. Ca. v. ADLER.

by some chemical action arising from the materials in the goods
themselves. They all presented the appearance of having been
burned or charred within the boxes. The clothing was not injured
by any external force or accident, but whatever the injury was it
was the result of the inherent infirmity of the goods themselves.
Neither the plaintiffs nor defendants knew, at the time the insurance
was effected, that the goods were liable to spontaneous combustion,
or to be injured by any inherent defect in the goods. No extra
premium to cover such risk was paid. Under these circumstances
the defendants claim that, by the general principles of insurance
law, they are not liable for a loss by spontaneous combustion caused
by the inherent infirmity of the goods themselves.
This was a marine policy, and one of the dangers insured against,
by the terms of the policy, was fire. But while this is undoubtedly
so, the question remains, and is still undecided in this state, whether
the term " fire," used in ordinary marine policy, will, upon general
principles, cover the case of spontaneous combustion caused by an
inherent infirmity in the article insured, and not the result of accident or peril of the sea. There is no doubt of the liability of the
defendant company, under its policy, had the ship taken fire, and
the goods have been consumed, or had the fire originated from any
of the perils insured against; but the question is a very different
one when, as in this case, the goods are in good faith insured, and
believed both by plaintiffs and defendant not to be liable to spontaneous combustion by reason of their inherent infirmity, but which
in fict were so liable, and were so injured. The authorities are
few upon this subject, and neither full nor satisfactory. One of the
oldest to which we have access is Emerigon, who says (page 290):
"Article 12 of another title establishes, as a general rule, that
everything which happens through the inherent vice of the thing,
or by the act of the owners, master, or merchant shipper, shall not
be reputed a peril, if not otherwise borne on the policy. It is, then,
certain that the insurers never answer for damages and losses which
happen directly through the act or fault of the assured himself. It
would be in fact intolerable that the assured should be indemnified
by others for a loss of which he is the author. This rule is grounded
on first principles. It is a general rule, from which it is not permitted to derogate by a contrary agreement. As Pothier remarks,
it is evident that I cannot validly agree with any one that he shall
charge himself with the faults that I shall commit."
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We do not understand this learned author to mean that an article
may not be insured that is inherently liable to spontaneous combustion or decay, provided it is so expressed in the policy, but not
otherwise. But if the loss happens through the fault of the
assured,then the insurers are not liable, whatever may be the terms
of the policy. For example, if an article is insured which, when
dry, is not liable to spontaneous combustion, but when he puts it on
board it is wet, in such case no recovery can be had. Such we
understand to be the views of this author.
The next case to which we are referred, is the case of Boyd v*.
In that case Lord ELLENBOROUGH said:
Dubois, 8 Camp. 138.
"If the hemp was put on board in a state liable to effervesce, and it
did effervesce, and generate the fire which consumed *it,upon the
common principles of insurance law the assured cannot recover for
a loss which he himself has occasioned."
The defendant in that case attempted to prove that the hemp,
which was insured, was put aboard ship in a damaged condition,
and for that reason was apt to ferment and take fire. This case is
in accord with Emerigon.
The next authority, Parsons, in Ihis work on Contracts (vol. 2,
p. 874, sect. 6), says: " It is another rule that insurers are not
liable for property destroyed by the effect of its own inherent defieiencies or tendencies, unless these tendencies are made active and
destructive by a peril insured against. Thus, if hemp which was
dry when laden be afterwards wet by a peril of the sea, and hy
reason of such wet ferments or rots or burns, the insurers would
be liable."
And that very learned author refers to both Emerigon and the
case of Boyd v. Dubois as his authorities.
Chancellor KENT also takes a similar view in his Commentaries.
3 Kent, chap. 48. Phillips on Insurance (chap. 13, marginal page)
says : "It is a general rule that insurers are not, under the common
form of the policy, liable to any damage or loss arising from the
qualities or defects of the subject insured, since these are not among
the perils assumed by the underwriters."
Parsons on the Law of Marine Insurance (vol. 2, p. 216), holds
the same view. He says: " It is also a rule that the insurers are
liable for no subject-matter of insurance which is destroyed by reason
of its own inherent defects or tendencies. But this rule does not
apply to tendencies which are called into activity only by a peril
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insured against. Thus, if hemp insured burns up or rots from
spontaneous ignition or fermentation, it being known that this may
happen if the hemp be damp, but not if it be dry, the question would:
be whether it-was damp or dry when it -was put on board. But if
the hemp were dry when laden, and was afterward-s -%et by reason
of the straining of the ship in a storm, or by the shipping of a sea,
or any like peril, then the insurers, whether on ship or cargo, would
be liable."
All these authorities refer to Emerigon and the case in 3 Camp.,
and are all upon marine insurance.
On the other hand, we have been referred to the case of British
Amer. Ins. Go. v. Joseph, 9 L. C.448 (decided in the Court of
Appeals for Lower Canada), which has been supposed to decide that
a fire insurance (not marine) covers the risk of spontaneous combustion; and,. citing that case only, Mr. May, in his work on Fire
Insurance, comes to the same conclusion. The Lower Canada case
is certainly very imperfectly reported. The report is in French,
and the court gave no opinion. The terms of the policy are not set
out, and but a very few of the facts in the case. It is by no means
clear, from the few facts that are stated, that the spontaneous combustion did not originate in a heap of uninsured coal, and extend
from that to the insured coal. But suppose the case has all the
effect claimed for it by the appellee, and does decide that in a purely
fire insurance, the risk of spontaneous combustion is covered, we
could not agree that it should overrule the long list of high authorities to the contrary in marine policies; more especially since the
reasons to the contrary, we think, are satisfactory. No well-managed insurance company would take a marine risk on an article
inherently liable to spontaneous combustion; nor would any prudent shipmaster or owner receive such on his vessel, as not merely
the property so insured, but the property of others, and the safety
of the ship. and the lives of the crew, would be endangered by so
doing. It would, as Emerigon says, be intolerable that the owner
should receive pay for goods that destroyed themselves. The object
of a marine policy is to insure against the perils of the sea, and not
against the perils incident to the goods themselves.
In this case it is very clear that the goods were injured by their
own inherent infirmity, and that such inherent infirmity was not
called into activity by any peril insured against. We think such
loss was not within the contemplation of either party to the con-

